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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 4411 
B. 1. Driscoll, Esq. ISB No. 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
414 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Telefax: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendants, Doyle Beck, 
and Kirk Woolf 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., 
An Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL 
AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability corporation, DOYLE 
BECK, an individual, and KIRK WOOLF, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV -06-7097 
) 
) DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S 
) REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) ) . 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE ) 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL ) 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
Corporation, DOYLE BECK, an individual, ) 
and KIRK WOOLF, an individual, ) 
) 
DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS Page 1 
1 r -,.' 
.LhO' 
Counterclaimants, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS WATERS, ) 
an individual, ) 
) 
Counter-defendants. ) 
COMES NOW, defendant, Kirk Woolf, by and through counsel of record, Bryan D. 
Smith, Esq., of the finn Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, and pursuant to the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, respectfully requests the court to instruct the jury with the attached requested 
jury instructions numbered 1 through 12. 
These instructions are in addition to the jury instructions requested by all other parties to 
which Kirk Woolf has not objected. 
Defendant specifically reserves the right to withdraw any of these instructions, or to 
submit, revise or supplement these instructions to conform to proof presented at the time of trial. 
Moreover, defendant reserves the right to object to the jury instructions filed by the 
plaintiff. 
DATED this 
~)v-? day of February, 2009. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, 
PLLC 
~iP~ Bryan D. S1i 
Attomeys for Defendant Kirk Woolf 
DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 1 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the cG;:fFebruary, 2009 I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS to be served by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight 
delivery, addressed to the following: 
[ ~.Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
[~S. Mail 
[ 1 Facsimile Transmission 
I 1 Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq. 
Lance J. Schuster, Esq. 
John M. Avondet, Esq. 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Mark R. Fuller, Esq. 
Daniel Beck, Esq. 
FULLER & CARR 
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201 
P. O. Box 50935 
Idaho Falls. ID 83405-0935 
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:FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
---
The following facts are not in dispute: 
1. Prior to September 26, 2006, Plaintiff put cooling water, reverse osmosis water and water 
softener brine into the sanitary sewer service connected to Plaintiff s business premises. 
(01122/07, Response to Request for Admission No. 21) 
2. Printcraft does not own Block 1, Lot 5 of the Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park 
Subdivision. (10/26107 Response to Request for Admission No.3) 
3. Printcraft Press never built any building in the Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park 
subdivision. (10/26/07 Response to Request for Admission No.4) 
4. Printcraft Press never purchased any property from Sunnyside Industrial and Professional 
Park, LLC or Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc .. (10/26107 Response to Request for 
Admissions No.5 and No. 43). 
5. Printcraft occupied the premises on Block 1, Lot 5 of the Sunnyside Industrial and 
Professional Park subdivision in January of 2006. (10/26107 Response to Request for 
Admission No. 11) 
6. A contract existed between Sunnyside Park Utilities and Printcraft for the provision of 
sew-er service and Printcraft breached the contract by discharging waste in violation of 
state law, specifically IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03. (Memorandum Decision and Order dated 
April 23, 2008, pg. 9). 
IDJI 1.07 and referenced Admissions and Orders 
Page 1 of 16 
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DUTY TO DISCLOSE (General) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Silence may constitute fraud when a duty to disclose exists. To establish a duty to 
disclose, Printcraft has the burden of proving the following proposition by clear and convincing 
evidence: 
1. Kirk Woolf knew of a fact; 
2. Printcraft did not know of the fact; 
3. Kirk Woolf knew that Printcraft did not know ofthe fact; and 
4. Both parties share a misconception about a basic assumption about the fact that is 
so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties. 
If you find fi'om your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven any 
of the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for 
Kirk Woolf. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all 
of the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then you should treat Kirk 
Woolf's failure to disclose the fact as a statement by Kirk Woolf of the non-existence of the fact. 
Smvards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 8 P.3d 1245 (2000). 
Thieme v. Worst, 113 Idaho 455, 459, 745 P.2d 1076 (Ida.App. 1987) 
Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 27, 936 P.2d 219 (Ida. App. 1997) 
167 Page 2 of 16 
FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-general) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
1. Kirk Woolf failed to disclose a fact to Printcraft and thereby Kirk Woolf is 
treated as having made the statement that the fact did not exist; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. Kirk Woolf either knew the statement was false or were unaware of whether the 
statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. Printcraft did not know that the statement was false; 
6. Kirk Woolf intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act upon it in a 
manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. Printcraft did rely upon the truth of the statement: 
8. Printcraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. Printcraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of fraud have been 
proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printcraft on this issue. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has 
not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Kirk Woolf. 
161-'11 
..1. t1.. 
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IDJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified) 
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-connections) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
1. That Kirk Woolf failed to disclose that the building to be occupied by Printcraft 
could not be connected to Sunnyside Park Utilities septic system, and thereby 
Kirk Woolf is treated as having made the statement that the building to be 
occupied by Printcraft could be connected to Sunnyside Park Utilities septic 
system; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. Sunnyside Park Utilities either knew the statement was false or was unaware of 
whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. Printcraft did not know that the statement was false; 
6. Sunnyside Park Utilities intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act 
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. Printcraft did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. Printcraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. Printcraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all the elements 
of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printcraft on this 
issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven all 
Page 5 of 16 
the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for 
Kirk Woolf. 
IOJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified) 
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-limitations) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
1. That Kirk Woolf failed to disclose that the septic system had limitations as to 
quantity of substances that could be discharged, and thereby Kirk Woolf is treated 
as having made the statement that there were no quantity limitations on the septic 
system; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. Kirk Woolf either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the 
statement was true at the time the statement \vas made. 
5. Printcraft did not know that the statement was false; 
6. Kirk Woolf intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act upon it in a 
maimer reasonably contemplated; 
7. Printcraft did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. Printcraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. Printcraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all the elements 
of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printcraft on this 
issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven all 
the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for 
Kirk Woolf. 
is Page 7 of 16 
IDJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified) 
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-Third Party Beneficiary 
Agreement and Rules and Regulations) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
1. That Kirk Woolf failed to disclose that the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement 
and Rules and Regulations governed the building Printcraft was to occupy, and 
thereby Kirk Woolf is treated as having made the statement that Third Party 
Beneficiary Agreement and Rules and Regulations did not govern the building 
Printcraft was to occupy; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. Sunnyside Park Utilities either knew the statement was false or was unaware of 
whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. Printcraft did not know that the statement was false; 
6. Sunnyside Park Utilities intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act 
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. Printcraft did rely upon the truth of the statement: 
8. Printcraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. Printcraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent ofthe damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all the elements 
of iI-aud by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printcraft on this 
issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven all 
Page 9 of 16 
16 
the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for 
Kirk Woolf. 
IDJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified) 
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MATERIALITY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
---
"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation in determining the 
party's course of action. A representation is material if (a) a reasonable person would 
attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the 
transaction in question, or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to 
know that the recipient is likely to regard the matter as impoliant in determining the 
choice of action, whether or not a reasonable person would so consider. 
IDJI 6.08.5 
Page 11 of 16 
RELIANCE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The term reliance means a voluntary choice of conduct by the person harmed and [implies] that 
the person exercising it can decide between available alternatives. There is no reliance if the 
party relies on its own judgment or investigations or its own examinations of the property 
involved, or on the advice of third persons. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1291 (6th Ed. 1990)(Quoted in JvfcCormack v. Amsouth Bal1k, 759 So.2d 
538 (Ala. 1999). 
IYeitzel v. Jukich, 73 Idaho 301, 305, 251. P. 2d 542 (1952) 
Nelsen v. Hoff, 70 Idaho 354, 360, 218 P. 2d 345 (1950) 
Page 12 of 16 
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REASONABLE RELIANCE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Reasonable reliance means that the party had the right to rely and that the reliance was justified. 
In order for the reliance to be justified the reliance must have been rightful, defensible, and 
warranted or sanctioned by law. 
-Order, December 26,2007, p.3. 
-Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500,507, 112 P.3d 788 (2005). ("One of the elements that must be 
proven in order to establish fraud is justifiable reliance upon a false statement or 
representation. "). 
-Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Logging, 121 Idaho 247,251, 824 P.2d 178 (Ida.App. 1992). 
-Black's Law Dictionary definition of "Justifiable" Revised Fourth Edition (1968). 
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PROXIMATE CAUSE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
When I use the express "proximate cause," or "proximately caused," I mean a cause that. 
in natural or probable sequence, produce the injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It 
need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, 
loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have 
occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of 
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about 
the injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to 
which each contributes to the injury. 
IDJI 2.30.2-Proximate cause-"substantial factor," without "but for" test. 
Page 14 of 16 
I\UTIGA TION OF DAMAGES 
Instruction NO. 
----
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the 
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from the failure 10 exercise 
such care cannot be recovered. 
IDJI 9.14 Mitigation of damages 
Page 15 of 16 
NO ENFORECEABLE CONTRACT 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
As a matter of law, the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement and Rules and Regulations are 
not enforceable against Printcraft. 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
414 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Telefax: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendants, Doyle Beck, 
and Kirk Woolf 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Plaintift~ 
v. 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., 
An Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRlAL 
AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability corporation, DOYLE 
BECK, an individual, and KIRK WOOLF, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV -06-7097 
) 
) DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S 
) REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE ) 
INDUSTRlAL AND PROFESSIONAL ) 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
Corporation, DOYLE BECK, an individual, ) 
and KIRK WOOLF, an individual, ) 
) 
DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 1 
is 
Counterclaimants, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS WATERS, ) 
an individual, ) 
) 
Counter-defendants. ) 
COMES NOW, defendant, Doyle Beck, by and through counsel of record, Bryan D. 
Smith, Esq., of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, and pursuant to the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, respectfully requests the court to instruct the jury with the attached requested 
jury instructions numbered 1 through 12. 
These instructions are in addition to the jury instructions requested by all other pm1ies to 
which Doyle Beck has not objected. 
Defendant specifically reserves the right to withdraw any of these instructions, or to 
submit, revise or supplement these instructions to conform to proof presented at the time of trial. 
Moreover, defendant reserves the right to object to the jury instructions filed by the 
plaintiff. 
'7/~-
DATED this ---,,,---,f __ day of February, 2009. 
SMITH, DIUSCOLL & ASSOCIATES, 
Attomeys for Defendant Doyle Beck 
DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I ~fFebruary, 2009 I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS to be served by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight 
delivery, addressed to the following: 
[ t-]/u. S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
[ t.VtJ.S.~Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] :Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq. 
Lance 1. Schuster, Esq. 
John M. Avondet, Esq. 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Mark R. Fuller, Esq. 
Daniel Beck, Esq. 
FULLER & CARR 
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201 
P. O. Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935 
DEI<"ENDANT DOYLE BECK'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 1 
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FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
---
The following facts are not in dispute: 
1. Prior to September 26, 2006, Plaintiff put cooling water, reverse osmosis water and water 
softener brine into the sanitary sewer service connected to Plaintiff s business premises. 
(01122/07, Response to Request for Admission No. 21) 
2. Printcraft does not own Block 1, Lot 5 of the Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park 
Subdivision. (10/26/07 Response to Request for Admission No.3) 
3. Printcraft Press never built any building in the Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park 
subdivision. (10/26/07 Response to Request for Admission No.4) 
4. Printcraft Press never purchased any propeliy from Sunnyside Industrial and Professional 
Park, LLC or Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc .. (10/26/07 Response to Request for 
Admissions No.5 and No. 43). 
5. Printcraft occupied the premises on Block 1, Lot 5 of the Sunnyside Industrial and 
Professional Park subdivision in January of 2006. (10/26/07 Response to Request for 
Admission No. 11) 
6. A contract existed between Sunnyside Park Utilities and Printcraft for the provision of 
sewer service and Printcraft breached the contract by discharging waste in violation of 
state law, specifically IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03. (Memorandum Decision and Order dated 
April 23, 2008, pg. 9). 
IDJI 1.07 and referenced Admissions and Orders 
Page 1 of 16 
DUTY TO DISCLOSE (General) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
--
Silence may constitute fraud when a duty to disclose exists. To establish a duty to 
disclose, Printcraft has the burden of proving the following proposition by clear and convincing 
evidence: 
1. Doyle Beck knew of a fact; 
2. Printcraft did not know of the fact; 
3. Doyle Beck knew that Printcraft did not know of the fact; and 
4. Both parties share a misconception about a basic assumption about the fact that is 
so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven any 
of the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for 
Doyle Beck. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all 
of the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then you should treat Doyle 
Beck's failure to disclose the fact as a statement by Doyle Beck of the non-existence of the fact. 
SOH'ards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 8 P.3d 1245 (2000). 
Thieme v. Worst) 113 Idaho 455, 459,745 P.2d 1076 (Ida.App. 1987) 
Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 27, 936 P.2d 219 (Ida. App. 1997) 
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-general) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
1. Doyle Beck failed to disclose a fact to Printcraft and thereby Doyle Beck is 
treated as having made the statement that the fact did not exist; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. Doyle Beck either knew the statement was false or were unaware of whether the 
statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. Printcraft did not know that the statement was false; 
6. Doyle Beck intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act upon it in a 
manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. Printcraft did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. Printcraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. Printcraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of fraud have been 
proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printcraft on this issue. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has 
not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Doyle Beck. 
1S Page 3 of 16 
IDJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified) 
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-connections) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
1. That Doyle Beck failed to disclose that the building to be occupied by Printcraft 
could not be cOID1ected to Sunnyside Park Utilities septic system, and thereby 
Doyle Beck is treated as having made the statement that the building to be 
occupied by Printcraft could be connected to Sunnyside Park Utilities septic 
system; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. Sunnyside Park Utilities either knew the statement was false or \vas unaware of 
whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. Printcraft did not know that the statement was false; 
6. Sunnyside Park Utilities intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act 
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. Printcraft did rely upon the truth of the statement: 
8. Printcraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. Printcraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all the elements 
of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printcraft on this 
issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven all 
Page 5 of 16 
the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for 
Doyle Beck. 
IDJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified) 
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-limitations) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
1. That Doyle Beck failed to disclose that the septic system had limitations as to 
quantity of substances that could be discharged, and thereby Doyle Beck is treated 
as having made the statement that there were no quantity limitations on the septic 
system; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. Doyle Beck either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the 
statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. Printcraft did not know that the statement was false; 
6. Doyle Beck intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act upon it in a 
manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. Printcraft did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. Printcraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances: 
9. Printcraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all the elements 
of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printeraft on this 
issue. If you fInd from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven all 
the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for 
Doyle Beck. 
Page 7 of 16 
IDJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified) 
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-Third Party Beneficiary 
Agreement and Rules and Regulations) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
1. That Doyle Beck failed to disclose that the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement 
and Rules and Regulations governed the building Printcraft was to occupy, and 
thereby I?oyle Beck is treated as having made the statement that Third Party 
Beneficiary Agreement and Rules and Regulations did not govern the building 
Printcraft was to occupy; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. Sunnyside Park Utilities either knew the statement was false or was unaware of 
whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. Printeraft did not know that the statement was false; 
6. Sunnyside Park Utilities intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act 
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. PrinteraH did rely upon the truth ofthe statement; 
8. Printeraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. Printeraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all the elements 
of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printcraft on this 
issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven all 
Page 9 of 16 
the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for 
Doyle Beck. 
IDJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified) 
1 Page 10 of 16 
MATERIALITY 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation in determining the 
party's course of action. A representation is material if (a) a reasonable person would 
attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the 
transaction in question, or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to 
know that the recipient is likely to regard the matter as important in determining the 
choice of action, whether or not a reasonable person would so consider. 
IDJI6.08.5 
Page 11 of 16 
RELIANCE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The term reliance means a voluntary choice of conduct by the person harmed and [implies] that 
the person exercising it can decide between available alternatives. There is no reliance if the 
party relies on its own judgment or investigations or its own examinations ofthe property 
involved, or on the advice of third persons. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1291 (6th Ed. 1990)(Quoted in McCormack v. Amsouth Bank, 759 So.2d 
538 (Ala. 1999). 
Weitzel v. Jukich, 73 Idaho 301, 305, 251. P. 2d 542 (1952) 
Nelsen v. Hoff, 70 Idaho 354, 360, 218 P. 2d 345 (1950) 
Page 12 of 16 
REASONABLE RELIANCE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Reasonable reliance means that the party had the right to rely and that the reliance was justified. 
In order for the reliance to be justifIed the reliance must have been rightful, defensible, and 
warranted or sanctioned by law. 
-Order, December 26,2007, p.3. 
-Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 507,112 P.3d 788 (2005). ("One of the elements that must be 
proven in order to establish fraud is justifiable reliance upon a false statement or 
representation.") . 
-Deulz-Allis Credit Corp v. Logging, 121 Idaho 247, 251,824 P.2d 178 (lda.App. 1992). 
-Black's Law Dictionary definition of "Justifiable" Revised Fourth Edition (1968). 
1 1"'1 (, 
...i.. t ,_' Page 13 of 16 
PROXIMATE CAUSE 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
When I use the express "proximate cause," or "proximately caused," I mean a cause that, 
in natural or probable sequence, produce the injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It 
need not be the only cause. It is sufIicient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, 
loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have 
occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of 
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about 
the injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to 
which each contributes to the injury. 
IDJI 2.30.2-Proximate cause-"substantial factor," without "but for" test. 
Page 14 of 16 
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES 
Instruction NO. 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the 
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from the failure to exercise 
such care cannot be recovered. 
IDJI 9.14 Mitigation of damages 
Page 15 of 16 
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NO ENFORECEABLE CONTRACT 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
As a matter of law, the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement and Rules and Regulations are 
not enforceable against Printcraft. 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
JetTrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
j eft@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. an Idaho 
corporation, TRA VIS WATERS, an 
individual, 
PlaintitI/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual, 
KIRK WOOLF, an individual, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-06-7097 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
The plaintiff Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft), through counsel of record, Beard 
St. Clair Gaffney P A, respectfully submits the following proposed j my instructions for 
use at trial. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on February 16, 2009, 1 
served a true and correct copy of the SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE SUMMARIES AND SIGN 
on the following by the method of delivery designated below: 
Mark Fuller 
Fuller & Carr 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935 
Fax: (208) 524-7167 
Bryan D. Smith 
Smith, Driscoll & Associates 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731 
Fax: (208) 529-4166 
o U.S. Mail 
o U.S. Mail 
Hand-delivered 0 Facsimile 
Hand-delivered o Facsimile 
D U.S. M~ Hand-delivered o F· . '1 .. 'aCS11111 e 
[DJI 1. 02 - Corporate parties 
INSTRUCTION NO. -1-
The corporations involved in this case are entitled to the same fair 
and unprejudiced treatment that an individual would be under like 
circumstances. You should decide this case with the same impartiality that 
you would use in deciding a case between individuals. 
Given 
----
Refused 
----
Modified __ _ 
Other 
17(, 
ID.fII.20.1 Burden of pro of - preponderance of evidence 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
When I say that a patiy has the burden of proof on a proposition, or 
use the expression "if you find" or "if you decide." I mean you must be 
persuaded that the proposition is more probably true than not true. 
Given 
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
----
ID.JII.20.2 Burden olprool- clear and cOl1v;ncing evidence 
INSTRUCTION NO. !j 
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear 
and convincing evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly 
probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher burden than the 
general burden that the proposition is more probably true than not true. 
Given 
----
Refused 
----
Modified 
Other 
----
IDJI 1. 22 ~ Deposition testimony 
INSTRUCTION No.A 
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A 
deposition is testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved in 
writing. This evidence is entitled to the same consideration you would give 
had the witness testified from the witness stand. 
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is 
a record of the testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be 
available to you during your deliberations. 
Comment: 
The last sentence has been added to IDJI 124 to anticipate inquiry from the jury. 
Given 
-----
Refused 
----
Modified 
----
Other 
-----
IDJI 1.24.1 - Circumstantial evidence without de/Tnition 
INSTRUCTION NO ~ 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no 
distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a 
reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such convincing force 
as it may carry. 
Given 
----
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
-----
IDJI 1.28 - Evidence admittedfor limited purpose 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. 
called your attention to this when the evidence was admitted. I remind you 
that whenever evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, you must not 
consider such evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for 
which it was admitted. 
Given 
----
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
-------
171t 
IDJI 2.30.2 - Proximate cause - "subsfanf;aljactor, ., without "but/or" fest. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ::1 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage 
complained of It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a 
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occUlTed 
anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the 
fraudulent conduct of two or more persons or entities contributes 
concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an injury, the conduct of 
each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which 
each contributes to the injury. 
Given 
-----
Refused 
----
Modified 
----
Other 
-----
! D.!! 4.60 - Fraud ~ issues (lvlodi/ied) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That the defendant failed to disclose inf01111ation to the 
plaintiff: 
2. The failure to disclose the information left the plaintiff with 
false knowledge about an existing situation or condition. 
3. The omitted infol111ation was material to the plaintiff; 
4. The defendant knew that the information existed and that the 
plaintiff lacked the information. 
5. The plaintiff did not know that its knowledge about the 
existing situation or condition was false; 
6. The plaintiff did rely upon the nondisclosures; 
8. The plaintiffs reliance was reasonable under all the 
circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by 
reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff~ and the 
amount thereof 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the 
elements of fraud have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then 
your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this issue. If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has 
.< 
! 
not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then yom verdict should 
be for the defendant. 
Comment: 
A definition of materiality can be found in IDJI 6.08.5. 
See Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz. Inc .. 134 Idaho 84, P.2d 303 
(2000); Watts v. Krebbs, 131 Idaho 616, 962 P.2d 387 (1998); Magic Lantern Prods. Inc. 
v. Dolsot 126 Idaho 805, 892 P.2d 480 (1995). 
See also, Witt v. Jones. 111 Idao 477, 722 P.2d 474 (1986): Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 
Idaho 700, 682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Paw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387, 613 P.2d 1338 
(1980); Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331 597 P.2d 217 (1979); King v. McNeeL Inc., 94 
Idaho 444, 489 P.2d 1324. 
Given 
----
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
-------
INSTRUCTION NO. q 
This is a case of "constructive fraud." That means there is no need for the 
plaintiff to prove the defendants' actual intent to deceive. That intent is inferred directly 
from the relationship. 
Counl1y Cove Dev., Inc. v. J\;fyrol1, ] 43 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288, 294 (2006). 
Given 
----
Refused 
--"--
Modified 
---
Olher 
-------
INSTRUCTION NO. It} 
Fraud may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. 
Idaho State Tax Comm'n v. HaLl/zinger, 137 Idaho 401, 404, 49 P.3d 206,409 (2002). 
Given 
iHodified 
--~--------
Other 
~~~-
'1 1 
.,!, 
INSTRUCTION NO. It 
The term "material fact" refers to the importance of the misrepresentation or 
omitted fact in determining a plaintiffs course of action. The importance of the alleged 
non-disclosures in this case is for you to decide. 
Watts 1'. Krebs, 962 P.2d 387, 390 (Idaho 1998). 
Given 
----
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
1717 
INSTRUCTION NO. (1 
A duty to speak arises in situations where the parties do not deal on equal terms or 
where information to be conveyed is not already in possession of the other party. 
G&M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). 
Given 
----
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
-----
INSTRUCTION NO. 1,3; 
A party is under a duty 10 disclose information in a transaction when the party 
knows a f~lCt is material and is unknown to the other party. 
SOlrards 1'. Rathbun, 8 P.3d 1245 (Idaho 2000). 
Given 
Refused 
----
Modified 
Other 
------
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Fraud may be established by silence when a defendant had a duty to speak. 
Chiarella 1'. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
Given 
----
Refused 
---
Modified 
---
Other 
----
INSTRUCTION NO. I4$' 
When a septic system is designed, the system's minimum design t1O\v or capacity 
is determined by statute. The law requires that the system meet two conditions. First. 
septic tank must be large enough to handle two times the average daily t1ow. Second, the 
minimum capacity for the system as a whole, as designed, must be 20 gallons per person 
per day. 
IDAPA 58.01.03.007.07b-08 
Given 
A10dijied 
"~-"--
Other 
------"-~ 
INSTRUCTION NO. \tI 
The minimum capacity for septic system design under these circumstances is 20 
gallons per day per employee utilizing the Sunnyside septic system. 
See IDAPA 58.01.03.007.08 
Given 
---
Refused~ ____ _ 
f\;Jodified __ ~ __ _ 
Other 
17 
INSTRUCTION NO. n 
Neither the terms "process waste" nor "process water" are defined by Idaho law. 
See IDAPA 58.01.03 
Given 
Modified 
Other 
IDJI 9.00 - Cautionary instruction on damages 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
By glvmg you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not 
express any opinion as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. 
Given 
----
Refused 
----
Modified 
----
Other 
-----
1724 
ID.!I 9.01 Damage instruction for injuries to plaintifl general case (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO. J1 
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the 
defendants, the jury must determine the amount of money that will 
reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved to be 
proximately caused by the defendant's conduct. 
The damage the jury may consider are: 
1. The Total Cost of the Lease Discounted to Present Value or 
2. Costs to Collect, Store and Transport Sewage from the Time of Disconnection; 
and 
3. Moving Expenses Incurred as a Result of the Fraudulent Misconduct of 
Sunnyside, Beck and Woolf and 
4. Connection Costs to City ofldaho Falls Sewer System. 
Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury 
to decide. 
Given 
----
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
-----
11)J19.13 Present cash value 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that 
may accrue in the future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid 
now which, \vhen invested at a reasonable rate of interest. \vould be 
suftlcient to pay the future damages at the time and in the amount the future 
damages will be incun-ed. 
Given 
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
---
ID.!I 9. I4 - Mitigation (~ldamages 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to 
minimize the damage and prevent fUl1her damage. Any loss that results 
from a failure to exercise such care cannot be recovered. 
Given 
----
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
------
IDJI 9.20 - Punitive damages (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO. -» 
If plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's acts which proximately caused injury to the plaintiff were an 
extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct and that these acts 
·were malicious, £l:audulent, oppressive or outrageous you may, in addition to 
any compensatory damages to which you find the plaintiff entitled, award to 
plaintiff an amount which will punish the defendant and deter the defendant 
and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. These damages 
are called "punitive damages." 
Given 
Refused 
----
Modified 
Other 
----
INSTRUCTION NO . .!l:J 
Punitive damages may be awarded when a defendant has committed fi·aud. 
See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(1); s"ee also Walston 11. Monumental Life 11151. Co., 129 
Idaho 211. 221, 923 P.2d 456, 466 (1996). 
Given 
Refilsed 
. ~-----
Modified _~_~ __ 
Other 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Punitive damage awards are appropriate when the defendant is engaged in 
deceptive business practices operated for a profit which pose a danger to the general 
pUblic. Walston v, A10numental Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 21 L 221, 923 P.2d 456. 466 
(1996). 
Given 
----
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
---
IDJ19.2o.5 -- Punitive damages - consideration oldelendant's wealth 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You have been permitted to hear evidence peliaining to defendant's 
wealth and financial condition. This evidence was admitted far your 
consideration only \vith reference to the question of pW1itive damages in 
light of all other evidence befare you if you determine that such an award 
should be made in this case. 
Punitive damages are not a matter of right, but may be awarded in 
the jury's sound discretion, which is to be exercised without passion or 
prejudice. The law provides no mathematical formula by which such 
damages are to be calculated, other than any award of punitive damages 
must bear a reasonable relation to the actual hal111 done, to the cause thereof 
to the conduct of the defendant, and to the primary objective of detelTence. 
Comments: 
See Robinson v. State Farm Insurance, 137 Idaho 173,45 P.3d 829 (2002). 
Given 
-----
Refused 
----
Modified 
----
Other 
-----
1731 
IDJI 6.27. 1 Fraud (A1odi/ied) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
To establish the defense of fraud, the plaintiff has the burden proving by 
clear and convincing evidence each of the following propositions: 
1. That the defendant failed to disclose information to the plaintiff; 
2. The failure to disclose the information left. the plaintiff with false 
knowledge about an existing situation or condition. 
3. The omitted information was material to the plaintiff: 
4. The defendant knew that the information existed and that the plaintiff 
lacked the information. 
5. The plaintiff did not know that its knowledge about the existing 
situation or condition was false; 
6. The plaintiff did rely upon the nondisclosures; 
8. The plaintiff's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the 
false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff~ and the amount 
thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each 
of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the 
plaintiff. 
Comment: 
Materiality is defined in Instruction 6.08.5 
Given 
----
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
----
fDJ! 6.27.3 - Defense of non-disclosure (A1odffied) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A patiy is not obligated to perform a contract if that party establishes the 
defense of nondisclosure. To establish the defense of non-disclosure, the 
defendant has the burden of proving each of the follovving propositions by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
1. The defendants were aware of a fact vital to the essence of the 
contract; 
2. The plaintiff was unaware of the fact, and could not reasonably learn 
of it; 
3. The defendants knew that the defendant was una\vare of the true fact 
and knew that disclosure of the true fact would cOITect a basic assumption upon 
which the plaintiff was making the contract; 
4. The ddendants did not disclose the fact to the plaintin~ intending that 
the defendant would act in ignorance of the fact; 
5. The failure to disclose the true fact amounts to a failure to act in good 
faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing: and 
6. The plaintiff entered into the contract upon the reasonable 
assumption that the non-disclosed fact did not exist. 
If you find liOln your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each 
of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the 
plaintiff. 
Comment: 
There is not definitive Idaho authority on point. This instruction is felt to be 
superior to the previous IDJI 651. See, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 161; 
obiter dicta in Janinda v. Lanning, 87 Idaho 97 (1964). 
"'I i} 
.., 
The subject of duty to speak was tangentially addressed in Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 
91 Idaho 55, and Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, with references to 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 551. The committee feels the above instruction is 
consistent with those cases and the tort restatement, although cast in light of the 
Restatement of Contracts provisions. 
Given 
----
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
-----
JD.J! 6.40.! --Agency defined 
INSTRUCTION NO. ')~ 
The term "agent" refers to a person authorized by another, called the 
"principaL" to act for or in the place of the principal. A director or officer of 
a company is an agent of the company. A company is responsible for any 
act of the agent within the agent's scope of authority. 
Given 
-----
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
1 ~"'nr­
L I ,..( ,J 
INSTRUC110N No~1~ 
I f a director or officer of a company commits or participates in fraudulent 
conduct, whether or not it is also by or for a corporation, the director is personally liable 
to the injured people, and it does not matter \vhether the corporation is liable or not. 
Thus. a director or officer of a company can be held personally liable for fraud even if 
you find that the company itself did not engage in fraud. 
Eilopos v. Knox. 123 Idaho 400, 404-05 eet. App. 1992). 
Given 
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
-----
INSTRUCTION NO. 1;0 
Silence in circumstances where a prospective purchaser might be led to harmful 
conclusion is a form of representation. 
Sorensen 1'. Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 571 P.2d 769 (1977). 
Given 
----
Refused 
----
Modified 
---
Other 
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698) 
FULLER & CARR 
410 !VIEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201 
P . O. Box 5 0 935 
IDl"HO FALLS, 10 83405 0935 
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-5400 
FACSIMILE: (208) 524-7167 
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ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PAR!< 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, 
Idaho corporation, 
INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
an 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC., an Idaho 1 ted 
liability company, DOYLE BECK, 
an Individual, and KIRK WOOLF, 
an Individual, 
Defendants. ) 
) 
) 
) 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES,) 
INC. , an Idaho corporation, ) 
and SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND ) 
PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC., an) 
Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 
Counterclaimants, 
v. 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. , an 
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS 
WATERS, an Individual. 
Counter-Defendants. 
ORDER TO SHORTEN THE 1-
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-06-7097 
ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME 
Iy 
This matter having corne before this Court by and through the 
Motion to Shorten Time filed by Sunnyside, and good cause having 
been shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing on Defendants' Motion 
Limine to Exclude Written Leases and Testimony Re: ltJritten 
Lease Agreements shall be heard on Friday, February 27, 2009, at 
9:30 o'clock a.m. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a conformed copy of the 
foregoing ORDER SHORTENING TIME to the parties listed below on 
this day of 
Mark R. Fuller, Esq. 
FULLER & CARR 
P.O. Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, 10 83405 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
MCGRATH SMITH & ASSOCIATES 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, 10 83405 
Michael Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
2105 Coronado 
Idaho Falls, 10 83404 
ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME -2-
2009. 
BY: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
MINUTE ENTRY 
vs. Case No. CV-06-7097 
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Defendant. 
On the 18th day of February, 2009, pretrial conference and 
Plaintiff's motion in limine and Defendant's motion in limine 
came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, in open 
court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Michael Gaffney and Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared on behalf 
of the Plaintiff. 
Mr. Mark Fuller and Mr. Dan Beck appeared on behalf of the 
Defendant. 
Mr. Bryan Smith appeared on behalf of Defendants Doyle Beck 
and Kirk Wolf. 
Trial is scheduled for March 3, 2009. Trial is scheduled to 
last 8 days. There is a possibility that trial may continue into 
a third week. 
Mr. Gaffney presented Plaintiff's motion ln limine. Mr. 
Fuller argued in opposition to the motion. 
rebuttal argument. 
Mr. Gaffney presented 
The Court will take the matter under advisement and issue a 
decision as soon as possible. 
Mr. Fuller presented Defendant's motion in limine. Mr. 
Gaffney presented argument in opposition to Defendant's motion in 
limine. Mr. Smith joined in Defendant's motion in limine. Mr. 
Fuller presented rebuttal argument. 
The Court will take the matter under advisement and issue a 
decision as soon as possible. 
Mr. Smith advised the Court that he was filing a motion In 
limine re: Woolf felony conviction of 25 years ago. 
Mr. Smith addressed the Court in clarification of the Court's 
ruling. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
District Judge 
H:cv067097.7mo 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
J 
,,1 
I hereby certify that on the !b day of February, 2009, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Michael Gaffney 
Jeff Brunson 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Mark R. Fuller 
Dan Beck 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Bryan Smith 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICiAL pttpllllClo ._, 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVIEI::E4 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., and Idaho 
Corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., and Idaho Corporation, 
and SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, and Idaho 
limited liability corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -06-7097 
DECISION ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
Cunently before the Court are Plaintiff's motion in limine and Defendants 
Sunnyside's motion in limine. Following oral argument the Court took the motions under 
advisement and now issues its decision. 
ANALYSIS 
Trial comis have broad discretion when ruling on a motion in limine. Sun Valley 
Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 767, 86 P.3d 475. 481 
(2004). \Vhen presented with a motion in limine, a trial court has the authority to deny 
the motion and wait until trial to determine if the evidence should or should not be 
excluded. Gunter v. A1w]Jhy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16,25,105 P.3d 676, 685 
(2005)(citing Lanham v. Idaho Pmver Co., 130 Idaho 486, 492, 943 P.2d 912, 918 
(1997)). 
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At the outset, it is also worth noting that there have been multiple trial settings in 
this matter as well as multiple motions and hearings regarding discovery disputes. 
Continuances of the trial setting have occurred because of discovery and witness 
disclosure disputes. At this point in time, there can be no excuse for failing to provide 
required disclosures as to witnesses, exhibits, documents, evidence, etc. In view of this 
history, a further continuance of the trial is not an option. Accordingly, any failure to 
provide the required disclosures will result in the witness or evidence being precluded. 
A. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
In its motion, Plaintiff raises a number of issues as to witnesses and evidence. 
The COUli will take each issue separately. 
1. Kirby Olson 
Plaintiff seeks to preclude the testimony of Kirby Olson on the grounds that her 
opinion is based on theory without any actual knowledge of discharge into the septic 
system, concentrations, or alleged damages to the system. The Court agrees that 
testimony not based on the actual facts pertaining to a matter is not particularly probative: 
Ordinarily, testimony about mere possibilities rather than probabilities is 
inadmissible because it is speculative or irrelevant and does not aid in the 
fact-finding process. 
State v. Schneider, 129 Idaho 59, 62, 921 P.2d 759,762 (App. 1996). 
Defendants argue in part that Olson's testimony as to possibilities is now relevant 
because that testimony is based on actual concentrations as determined by Plaintiffs 
witness Roberi Starr. As such, Defendants assert that Olson's testimony is not 
speculative and at least may be used to rebut the testimony of Starr. 
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The Court finds that the opinions of Olson have been adequately disclosed. 
However, testimony in the abstract that is not related to actual facts pertaining to this 
matter is irrelevant. The Court can not at this time determine whether Olson's testimony 
(or rebuttal testimony) will be relevant or probative. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion as 
to Olson is denied at this time. 
2. Tyler Bowles 
Plaintiff seeks to preclude the testimony of Tyler Bowles on the grounds that his 
opinions and the basis of his opinions has not been disclosed. At different times, Plaintiff 
submitted interrogatories seeking disclosure of the "opinions" (Plaintiff'S First Set of 
Interrogatories) of Defendants' experts as well as the factual basis and substance of each 
opinion (Plaintiff's Fourth Set oflnterrogatories). The disclosure as to Bowles was that 
he would testify regarding punitive damages and would testify in rebuttal to Plaintiff's 
expert David Smith. 
Defendants correctly asseli that this matter is not subject to Rule 26, Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure which require a party to produce written reports of experts, etc. 
Defendants also take issue with Plaintiff's decision not to depose Bowles. 
However, the duty to disclose the opinions and conclusions of an expert witness 
rests with the party offering the expert, notwithstanding any decision by the opposing 
party on whether to take a deposition. The Court finds that merely disclosing the general 
nature or subject matter of Bowles' testimony is not an adequate disclosure of his 
opinions. Accordingly, Bowles will be precluded from testifying. 
3. Testimony of Actual Flows into the Septic System 
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Plaintiff seeks to preclude testimony as to actual or estimated flows into the septic 
system inasmuch as those flows were not metered or measurable until February 6, 2007, 
approximately two months after the disconnect from Plaintiff to the system. Defendant 
argues that Doyle Beck is in a position to offer testimony as to flows into the system. 
Certainly, any testimony as to actual flows into the system must be based on a 
proper foundation. There is some suggestion that Beck may make a reasonable estimate 
offlows based upon the amount of water going into the Printcraft's premises. The Court 
is unable to determine at this time whether there is a proper foundation for Beck to testify 
regarding actual flows. Such a determination will need to be made at the time of trial. 
Plaintiff s motion as to such testimony is denied at this time. 
4. Lance Schuster 
Plaintiff seeks to preclude or limit Defendants' examination of Lance Schuster, 
who in the course of representing Plaintiff, was involved in an alleged trespass. The 
Court finds that Schuster is a material witness to the alleged trespass and Defendants are 
entitled to examine him. However, the examination will be limited to the facts 
establishing the alleged trespass; questions as to why he was there and \vhat he was doing 
are not relevant. 
FurthelIDore, questions will be limited to the April 2, 2008 incident. Questions as 
to other alleged trespasses will not be permitted. The Court previously put the Parties on 
notice that it would not allow any additional claims. Defendants' Answer and 
Counterclaim to Plaintiff s Third Amended Complaint raised additional claims of 
trespass, and will not be permitted. 
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While Defendants argue that the new trespass claims are compulsory 
counterclaims required to be filed under Rule 13(a), LR.C.P., the COUli disagrees. The 
alleged trespass arose after the transaction and occurrence which forms the basis of this 
action. The alleged trespass arose in response to the existing dispute, not as pali of that 
dispute. The Court specifically finds that the trespass claims are not compulsory 
counterclaims in this matter. 
Defendants further argue that the alleged trespasses are relevant to the claim of 
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, that covenant is 
derivative and contingent upon a contract and the terms contained therein. Idaho Power 
Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204, 1216 (2000); Taylor v. 
BroYi'ning, 129 Idaho 483, 490, 927 P.2d 873, 880 (1996); Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. Bliss 
Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 288,824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991)). That covenant only 
requires that the parties perform in good faith the obligations set out in the contract. 
Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 109 P .3d 1104 (2005). 
Allegations of alleged tortuous conduct in the nature of a trespass have no effect 
on any alleged contractual obligations or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Accordingly, examination of Schuster will be limited to the issue of whether a 
trespass occurred on April 2, 2008. Defendants' trespass claims, other than the claims 
relating to the April 2, 2008 alleged trespass, are stricken and dismissed without 
prejudice. 
5. Trespass Damages 
Plaintiff seeks to preclude Defendant from arguing or seeking to introduce 
evidence as to Defendants' damages for the alleged trespass. While the record at this time 
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does not identify actual damages arising from the trespass, that alone does not necessarily 
preclude evidence which may be presented at the time of trial. However, the failure to 
timely disclose alleged damages in response to discovery will preclude such evidence. 
The record reflects that Doyle Beck testified that he was unaware of any damages 
arising from the alleged trespass. Plaintiff has a right to rely upon that discovery response 
in preparation for trial. Defendant can not introduce at trial evidence of alleged damages 
which have not previously been disclosed in response to discovery. Accordingly, 
argument or evidence as to actual damages arising from the trespass \vill be precluded. 
Nominal damages may be awarded for trespass in the absence of actual damages. 
Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P, 143 Idaho 641, 152 P.3d 2 (2006). Accordingly, 
Defendant is not precluded from seeking nominal damages. 
The Parties further raised the issue of whether Defendants may seek punitive 
damages for the alleged trespass. Based on the foregoing ruling, it is appropriate for the 
Court at this time to determine whether the issue of punitive damages as to the trespass 
claim will be submitted to the jury. In considering the requirements of I.e. §6-1604(1), 
the Court finds that even if the trespass is proved, the trespass does not include the type 
of malicious or outrageous conduct vvhich would support a claim for punitive damages. 
Accordingly, damages for the alleged trespass will be limited to nominal damages. 1 
6. Evidence of Damages to the Septic System. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendants should be precluding from offering any evidence 
regarding damages to Defendants' septic system. This is again a question of foundation 
as to the testimony of Defendants' expeli witnesses, and whether the testimony will assist 
I While nominal damages are clearly available in a common law trespass claim (See rDJI 4.40), query 
whether "nominal damages" in a claim under I.e. 6-202 are limited to $50.007 
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the trier of fact. The Court at this time can not make that determination. A ruling as to 
the admissibility of such testimony, upon an appropriate objection, will need to be made 
at the time of trial. 
7. Evidence of Testing and Sampling. 
Plaintiff seeks to preclude any evidence obtained by Beck or Woolf during any 
"authorized or unauthorized inspection" of Plaintiff s premises, primarily relying upon an 
alleged absence of a "chain of custody" as to that evidence. The Court finds no basis to 
preclude such evidence at this time. Again, the admissibility of such evidence will be 
based upon a proper foundation. In some cases, the absence of a chain of custody will 
make the evidence unreliable while in other instances, it simply goes to the weight of the 
evidence. Plaintiffs motion on this issue is denied at this time. 
8. Evidence of Cost to Repair or Upgrade. 
Plaintiff seeks to preclude evidence of any alleged repair costs or costs to upgrade 
Defendant's septic system. Whether any action of Printcraft resulted in costs to 
Defendants for repairs or upgrades is a disputed issue of fact. Causation is an issue for 
the jury. It is for a jury to determine whether the alleged repairs/upgrade were required 
regardless of any action by Printcraft. Plaintiff s motion on this issue is denied. 
B. DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE 
Defendants' motion in limine also raised a number of issues, which are addressed 
below. 
1. Flooring Expenses 
Sunnyside seeks to preclude evidence relating to expenses incurred in installing a 
heavier fireproof floor at the Printcrafi premises. That expense was paid for by a non-
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party, however, it is alleged that Printcraft's monthly rent was increased due to that 
expense. 
Again, construction costs incurred by a non-party are generally not recoverable. 
However, rental expenses paid, or to be paid, are particular to Printcraft and relevant to 
Printcraft's claim. It is not uncommon for the cost of customized improvements to a 
building to be amortized through monthly rental payments required of the tenant. 
Ultimately, a jury will need to determine whether the amount of the rental payment was 
reasonable and whether Printcraft is entitled to recover for rental payments. or any 
portion thereof. Evidence of the actual flooring expense is not relevant except to support 
a claim that the monthly rental payment (and the $600 monthly increase) was reasonable 
and recoverable. Certainly, if there is no challenge to the amount of monthly rent, 
flooring expenses and any summary of those expenses are irrelevant and inadmissible. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that such evidence may be relevant for a limited 
purpose, depending on the evidence and arguments made at the time of trial. Sunnyside's 
motion on this issue is denied at this time. 
2. Employee Expenses 
Sunnyside seeks to preclude evidence, including a written summary, of employee 
expenses allegedly incurred by Printcraft in relocating to the subject premises. While the 
summary was timely produced, documents which form the basis for the summary were 
not timely produced, despite those documents being requested in written discovery as 
well as being the subject of discussion in depositions. \Vhile counsel at the time of the 
deposition indicated a willingness to produce the underlying documents, that does not 
negate the ongoing duty to produce such documents at least by the time of discovery 
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cutoff, if not sooner. Parties have a clear right to timely receive disclosure of the other 
party's evidence, particularly as to such fundamental evidence as to a party's alleged 
damages. 
The Court finds that the records which form the basis for a claim for employee 
expenses allegedly incurred in relocating were not timely disclosed. As such, Printcraft 
is precluded from presenting evidence as to such alleged employee expenses. 
3. Moving Expenses 
Sunnyside seeks to preclude evidence as to moving expenses, and particularly a 
moving expense summary. Sunnyside's motion is primarily based on the argument that 
many of the alleged expenses are inaccurate and/or have subsequently been withdrawn. 
Again, any evidence of alleged damages in the nature of moving expenses (other than 
employee expenses which have been excluded) must be based upon a proper foundation. 
The Court can not make a determination at this time as to whether the claimed moving 
expenses are based upon a proper foundation. SmIDyside's motion on this issue is denied 
at this time. 
4. The Sign 
Sunnyside seeks to preclude evidence of a sign posted on or near the subject 
property referring to an "industrial park". There are apparently no photographs of the 
sign however Printcraft has had prepared a drawing of the sign and purports to have 
witnesses who can authenticate that the drawing accurately reflects the sign located on 
the premises. 
Sunnyside correctly argues that the sign, and any statement thereon, can not be 
the basis of any alleged misrepresentation. However, the sign may be probative to the 
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issue of Printcraft' s "due diligence" in determining whether the site would meet its needs. 
Statements on the sign, and any investigation or lack of investigation by Printcraft 
because ofthe sign, may be probative to the issue of whether Beck or Woolf knew that 
Printcraft was unaware of the limitations or restrictions on the septic system. Evidence as 
to the location of the sign, the author of the sign, etc., would go to the weight of the 
evidence. Accordingly, Sunnyside's motion on this issue is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Consistent with the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion in Limine is granted in part and 
denied in pmi, and Defendants' Motion in Limine is granted in part and denied in part. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this __ day of February, 2009 . 
.. ~ 
\ / 1 
tl JA : .//. ~ .//\~; 1\.11 /\( /--) .. \ ... / I. I\/V '/ ~TOE~\E. TIi--rGEY \J i5 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of February, 2009, I did send a true and conect 
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective cOUlihouse mailbox: 
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Mark R. Fuller 
Daniel R. Beck 
FULLER & CARR 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-9035 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Lance 1. Shuster 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
Beard st. Clair Gaffney 
2105 Coronado St. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Bryan D. Smith 
McGrath, Smith & Associates 
P.O. Box 50731 
414 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
Deputy Clerk 
17 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -- ISB No. 4411 
B. 1. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 70 10 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
414 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Telefax: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendants, Doyle Beck, 
and Kirk Woolf 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff: 
v. 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., 
An Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL 
AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability corporation, DOYLE 
BECK, an individual, and KIRK WOOLF, 
an individuaL 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV -06-7097 
) 
) DEFENDANTS DOYLE BECK 
) AND KIRK WOOLF'S 
) OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
) PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE ) 
INDUSTRlAL AND PROFESSIONAL ) 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
Corporation, DOYLE BECK, an individual, ) 
and KIRK WOOLF, an individual, ) 
) 
Counterclaimants, ) 
DEFENDANTS DOYLE BECK AND KIRK WOOLF'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
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) 
v. ) 
) 
PRlNTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS WATERS, ) 
an individual, ) 
) 
Counter-defendants. ) 
COME NOW the Defendants, Doyle Beck, and Kirk Woolf (hereafter collectively "Beck 
and Woolf') and file Beck and Woolfs Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions. 
I. BECK AND WOOLF JOIN IN SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
On February 24, 2009, Sunnyside Utilities filed its objection to plaintiffs proposed jury 
instructions. Beck and Woolf join in each and every objection Sunnyside Utilities raised in its 
objection to plaintiff s proposed jury instructions and incorporate by reference each and every 
objection SUllilyside Utilities raised in its objection to plaintiff s proposed jUly instruction. 
II. BECK AND WOOLF OBJECT TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS COURT SHOULD NOT GIVE ANY JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS ON PLAINTIFF'S FRAUD CLAIMS. 
The case of Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702 (2000) recogl11zes three bases for 
imposing a duty to disclose on a party. This cOUli has already determined that the first two bases 
from Sowards do not apply. As explained below, the third basis from S01+'ards likewise does not 
apply to Beck and Woolf because there was no contract between them and the defendant 
Printcraft Press, Inc. Moreover, no other Idaho law imposes on Beck and Woolf a duty to 
disclose any information to Printcraft because there is no transaction between them. Because 
Beck and Woolf owed Printcraft no duty of disclosure, the court should not give any jUly 
instruction on Pritncraft's fraud claims. 
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A. Beck And Woolf Owed No Duty To Disclose Any Information To Printcraft 
Because There Is No Contract Between The Parties. 
The Sowards case identifies three bases when a person may be under a duty to disclose 
information. 134 Idaho at 707. This cOUli has previously ruled that the first two bases do not 
apply in this case. As for the third basis, the Sowards cOUli explained that "[a] party may be 
under a duty to disclose ... (3) if a fact known by one party and not the other is so vital that if the 
mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable, and the party knowing the fact also knows 
that the other does not know it." ld. (emphasis added). Unsurprisingly, Sowards itself involved 
a land sale cOlltract. 
In setting forth the third basis from which a duty of disclosure may arise, the SO'wards 
court relied on Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55,415 P.2d 698 (1966), and Janinda v. Lanning, 
87 Idaho 91, 390 P.2d 826 (1964).1 Like Sowards, both Bethlahmy and Janinda arose from a 
land sale contract between the parties. Moreover, the Janinda cOUli derived this duty to disclose 
from Section 472 of the Restatement of Contracts. In sum, these cases and authorities establish 
that there must be a contract between the parties before imposing a duty to disclose on a party 
under the third basis from Sowards. This is particularly true where the lmv to determine the duty 
to disclose requires that the undisclosed fact be "so vital that if the mistake were mutual the 
contract would be voidable." (Emphasis added). This pOliion of the law makes no sense in the 
absence of a contract between the parties like the ones that existed in Sowards, Bethlahmy and 
Janinda. 
Here, it is undisputed that there is no contract between Printcraft and Beck and Woolf. 
This is clear from Printcraf1's Third Amended Complaint. Moreover, this court knows this fact 
for itself from all the motions for summary judgment flIed in this case. There is simply no 
DEFENDANTS DOYLE BECK AND KIRK WOOLF'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 3 
F.\CLIENTS\BDS\7965\Pleadings\049 Objections-Jury Instructions. doc 1756 
contract that Beck or Woolf have with Printcraft, and Printcraft never alleges a contract between 
it and Beck and Woolf. Because there is no contract between Printcraft and Beck and Woolf. 
Beck and Woolf own no duty of disclosure to Printcraft under the third basis from S011'ards. 
More specifically, Beck and Woolf owed no duty of disclosure to Printcraft because there could 
be no mutual mistake such that the contract would be voidable because there is flO contract. As 
such, the court should not give any jury instruction on Printcraft's fraud claims. 
B. Beck And Woolf Owed No Dutv To Disclose Any Information To Printcraft 
Because There Is No Transaction Or Special Relationship Between The Parties. 
Other than the third contractual basis for a duty of disclosure from Sowards, the only 
other possible basis in Idaho law for imposing a duty of disclosure on Beck and Woolf comes 
from Section 551 (2)( e) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
§ 5 5l. Liability For Nondisclosure 
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated, 
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to 
enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because 
of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other 
objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of 
those facts. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Section 551 (emphasis added). 
Several Idaho cases have considered Section 551 (2)( e). In determining whether a pmiy 
owes a duty of disclosure, these courts require both the existence of a transaction between the 
parties and a special relationship between the parties. The Idaho Supreme Court in Watts v. 
Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 620 (1998), imposed a duty of disclosure in a partition transaction after 
I The Bethlahmy case itself cited to Janinda. 
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recognizing that the parties had a special relationship as former spouses and cotenants of the 
property to be partitioned. In Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 59 (1966), the Court imposed a 
duty of disclosure on the contractor in a transaction involving the sale of property because the 
buyer and seller had a confidential relationship. However, in St. Alphonsus Reg 'I J\;fed. Ctr. Inc., 
v. Krueger, 124 Idaho 501, 508 (Ct.App. 1992), the court imposed no duty of disclosure on a 
hospital because although there was a transaction between the hospital and a doctor, there was no 
special relationship between them as creditor and debtor. 
Here, the court has already ruled that there is no special relationship between Printcraft 
and Beck and Woolf.2 As such, the fIrst basis for finding a duty under Section 551(2)(e) is not 
met. Further, there is no transaction between Printcraft and Beck or Woolf that could give rise to 
a duty of disclosure under Section 551(2). Each of the transactions in 'Watts, Bethlahmy, and SI. 
AlphonSliS was a first party transaction involving a direct relationship between the parties. No 
such first party transaction exists between Beck and Woolf and Printcraft. Thus, the second basis 
for finding a duty under Section 551(2)(e) is similarly unsatisfied 
The Idaho Supreme Court's recent holding in BECO Construction Company, Inc. v. J-U-
B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719 (2008) supports the conclusion that there is no transaction 
between Beck and Woolf and Printcraft sufflcient to impose a duty of disclosure under Section 
551. In BECO, the City of Pocatello hired J-U-B to engineer a project for the City. The City 
separately hired BECO as contractor to construct the project. BECO and J-U-B both worked on 
the project at the same time and frequently communicated with each other in their respective 
duties on the project. Nonetheless, the Idaho Supreme Court held there was no transaction as 
between J-U-B and BECO as follows: 
2 See p. 14 of the Memorandum Decision and Order filed August 31,2007. 
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The case at bar clearly involved a "commercial transaction" within the 
meaning ofI.C. § 12-120(3), but the transaction was between the City and 
RECD and not between J-U-B and RECD . ... The fact that J-U-B may have 
been the City's agent is not sufficient to establish an independent commercial 
transaction between J-U-B and BECO. 
145 Idaho at 726. 
In other words, although BECO and J-U-B were involved in the same transaction even on a daily 
basis, they had not entered a transaction between themselves. 
Here, just like the Court held in BEeO, just because Beck and Woolf and Printcraft were 
involved in some "transaction" does not mean that they had entered a transaction between 
themselves. There is no transaction between Beck and Woolf and Printcraft. As such, Section 
551 provides no basis for imposing a duty of disclosure on Beck and Woolf and the court should 
not give Printcraft any fraud instruction. 
Ill. CONCLUSION. 
There is no contract, transaction, or special relationship between Beck and Woolf and 
Printeraft. As such, Beck and Woolf owe no duty of disclosure to Printcraft: under the third basis 
hom Sowards or Section 551 (2) of the Restatement (Second) of TOlis. Thus, the court should 
not give Printcraft any fraud i~ction. 
DATED this b Y!;;.y of February, 2009. 
SMITH, DR!liCD14:r&~-&S9G 
BY~~--------~-~~~~-­
BryanD. Smi 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf 
DEFENDANTS DOYLE BECK AND KIRK WOOLF'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 6 
FICLlENTSIBDSl796SIPIeadingsl049 Objections-J my Instructions ,doc 
1759 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2)-{~ebruary, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS DOYLE BECK AND KIRK WOOLF'S 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF"S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS to be served by 
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
[ ~.Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] ~night Delivery 
[ tJ"Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq. 
Lance J. Schuster, Esq. 
Jolm M. Avondet, Esq. 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Mark R. Fuller, Esq. 
Daniel Beck, Esq. 
FULLER & CARR 
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201 
P. O. Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. ISB No. 4411 
B.1. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
414 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Telefax: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendants, Doyle Beck, 
and Kirk Woolf 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOl\fNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff: 
v. 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., 
An Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL 
AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability corporation, DOYLE 
BECK, an individual, and KIRK WOOLF, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV -06-7097 
) 
) DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S 
) REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL 
) JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE ) 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL ) 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
Corporation, DOYLE BECK, an individual, ) 
and KIRK WOOLF, an individual, ) 
DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED JURY 
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) 
Counterclaimants, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
PRlNTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, and TRA VIS WATERS, ) 
an individual, ) 
) 
Counter-defendants. ) 
COMES NOW, defendant, Doyle Beck, by and through counsel of record, Bryan D. 
Smith, Esq., of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, and pursuant to the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, respectfully requests the court to instruct the jury with the attached supplemental 
requested jury instructions numbered 13 through 17. 
These instructions are in addition to the jury instructions requested by all other parties to 
which Doyle Beck has not objected. 
Defendant specifically reserves the right to withdraw any of these instructions, or to 
submit, revise or supplement these instructions to conform to proof presented at the time of trial. 
Moreover, defendant reserves the right to object to the jury instructions filed by the 
plaintiff 
DATED this ').- tt /t;;ebruary, 2009. 
SMITH, DRlSCOLL & ASSOCIATE 
PLLC 
By: ____ == __ ~_-~------------__ 
Bryan 
Attorneys for Defendant Doyle Beck 
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CERTIFI~F SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2!f day of February, 2009 I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S SUPPLEMENTAL RI~QUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS to be served by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it 
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or 
overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
[ ~Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ]~night Delivery [ 1 Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq. 
Lance J. Schuster, Esq. 
John M. A vondet, Esq. 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Mark R. Fuller, Esq. 
Daniel Beck, Esq. 
FULLER & CARR 
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201 
P. O. Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935 
DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED JURY 
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
BECK PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. This 
form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you 
now. 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (COUNT III--SEWER CONNECTION) 
Question No.1: Did Beck know a fact that Printcraft did not know? 
Answer to Question No. 1: Yes [ __ I No[~ 
Question No.2: Was the fact so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be 
voidable? 
Answer to Question No.2: Yes [~ No 
Question No.3: Did Beck know that Printcraft did not know the fact? 
Answer to Question No.3: Yes [ __ ] No[~ 
If you answered "No" to any question between 1-3, then you should skip to question __ . If 
you answered "Yes to each question between 1-3, then continue to the next question. 
If you answered "Yes" to questions No. 23-25, then Beck had a duty to disclose a fact. Beck's 
failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not exist. For the 
following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Beck. 
Question No.4: Was the implied statement false? 
Answer to Question No.4: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No.5: Was the implied statement material? 
Answer to Question No.5: Yes [_] No[~ 
Question No.6: Did Beck know the implied statement was false, or was Beck unaware of 
whether the implied statement was true? 
Answer to Question No.6: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No.7: Was Beck unaware that the implied statement was false? 
Answer to Question No.7: Y es [~ No[~ 
Question No.8: Did Beck intend for Printcraft to rely upon the implied statement and act upon it 
in a manner reasonably contemplated? 
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Answer to Question No.8: Yes [---.J No[_J 
Question No.9: Did Beck rely upon the truth of the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No.9: Yes [ __ ] No[_J 
Question No. 10: Was Printcraft's reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances? 
Answer to Question No. 10: Yes [---.J No [---.J 
Question No. 11: Did Printcraft suffer damages which were proximately caused be reliance on 
the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No. 11: Yes [---.J No [---.J 
If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 4-11, then you should skip to question 
_. If you answered "Yes" to each and every question from question 4-11, then continue to 
answer questions 12 and 13. 
Question No. 12: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Printcraft? 
Answer to Question No. 12: 
Question No. 13: What is the amount of damages proven by Printcraft which were proximately 
caused by Beck's fraudulent non-disclosure? 
Answer to Question No. 13: We award the following amount of damages: 
.FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (COUNT IV--SE\VER CAPACITY) 
Question No. 14: Did Beck know a fact that Printcraft did not know? 
Answer to Question No. 14: Yes [_J No [---.J 
Question No. 15: Was the fact so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be 
voidable? 
Answer to Question No. 15: Yes [---.J No [---.J 
Question No. 16: Did Beck know that Printcraft did not know the fact? 
Answer to Question No. 16: Yes [_J No [---.J 
If you answered "No" to any question between 1-3, then you should skip to question . If 
you answered "Yes to each question between 1-3, then continue to the next question. 
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If you answered "Yes" to questions No. 23-25, then Beck had a duty to disclose a fact. Beck's 
failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not exist. For the 
following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Beck. 
Question No. 17: Was the implied statement false? 
Answer to Question No. 17 : Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 18: Was the implied statement material? 
Answer to Question No. 18: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 19: Did Beck know the implied statement was false, or was Beck unaware of 
whether the implied statement was true? 
Answer to Question No. 19: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 20: Was Beck unaware that the implied statement was false? 
Answer to Question No. 21: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 22: Did Beck intend for Printcraft to rely upon the implied statement and act upon 
it in a manner reasonably contemplated? 
Answer to Question No. 22: Yes ~ No [_1 
Question No. 23: Did Beck rely upon the truth of the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No. 23: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 24: Was Printcraft's reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances? 
Answer to Question No. 24: Yes [_] No[~ 
Question No. 25: Did Printcraft suffer damages which were proximately caused be reliance on 
the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No. 25: Yes [~ No[~ 
If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 4-11, then you should skip to question 
_. If you answered "Yes" to each and every question from question 4-11, then continue to 
answer questions 12 and 13. 
Question No. 26: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Printcraft? 
Answer to Question No. 26: 
Question No. 27: What is the amount of damages proven by Printcraft which were proximately 
caused by Beck's fraudulent non-disclosure? 
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Answer to Question No. 27: We award the following amount of damages: 
FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (COUNT V--THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
UTILITY AGREEMENT AND RULES AND REGULATIONS) 
Question No. 28: Did Beck know a fact that Printcraft did not know? 
Answer to Question No. 28: Yes [---.J No [---.J 
Question No. 29: Was the fact so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be 
voidable? 
Answer to Question No. 29: Yes [---.J No [---.J 
Question No. 30: Did Beck know that Printcraft did not know the fact? 
Answer to Question No. 31: Yes [---.J No [---.J 
If you answered "No" to any question between 1-3, then you should skip to question . If 
you answered "Yes to each question between 1-3, then continue to the next question. 
If you answered "Yes" to questions No. 23-25, then Beck had a duty to disclose a fact. Beck's 
failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not exist. For the 
following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Beck. 
Question No. 32: Was the implied statement false? 
Answer to Question No. 33: Yes [---.J No [---.J 
Question No. 34: Was the implied statement material? 
Answer to Question No. 34: Yes [---.J No [---.J 
Question No. 35: Did Beck know the implied statement was false, or was Beck unaware of 
whether the implied statement was true? 
Answer to Question No. 36: Yes [---.J No [---.J 
Question No. 37: Was Beck unaware that the implied statement was false? 
Answer to Question No. 37: Yes [---.J No[_J 
Question No. 38: Did Beck intend for Print craft to rely upon the implied statement and act upon 
it in a manner reasonably contemplated? 
Answer to Question No. 39: Yes [---.J No [---.J 
Question No. 40: Did Beck rely upon the truth of the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No. 41: Yes [---.J No [---.J 
Question No. 42: Was Printcraft's reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances? 
1767 
Answer to Question No. 43: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 44: Did Printcraft sufler damages which were proximately caused be reliance on 
the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No. 45: Yes [~ No~ 
If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 4-11, then you should skip to question 
_' If you answered "Yes" to each and every question fi'om question 4-11, then continue to 
answer questions 12 and 13, 
Question No. 46: What is the nature and extent of the damages suflered by Printcraft? 
Answer to Question No. 47: 
Question No. 48: What is the amount of damages proven by Printcraft which were proximately 
caused by Beck's fraudulent non-disclosure? 
Answer to Question No. 49: We award the following amount of damages: 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 
BECK'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
An agreement of compromise and settlement is a merger and bar of all pre-existing 
claims which the parties intended to settle thereby. The compromise agreement becomes the sole 
source and measure of the rights of the parties involved in the previously existing controversy. 
If you find that the parties in good faith entered into an agreement compromising and 
settling their adverse claims then the settlement agreement is a complete defense to any action 
based upon any issues resolved by the settlement agreement. 
Wilson v. Bogert. 81 Idaho 535, 542, 347 P.2d 341 (1959) 
Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 625, 151 P.3d 818 (2007) 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
BECK PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 
The defendant has asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction. An accord and 
satisfaction is a new contract which discharges the rights and obligations created by a previous 
contract. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. A bona fide dispute existed between the parties as to the performance due under the 
original contract; 
2. The defendant offered some stated performance in full satisfaction of the obligation due 
under the original contract; 
3. The plaintiff accepted the performance offered, and understood or reasonably should 
have understood, that it constituted full satisfaction of the obligation due under the 
original contract. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the 
foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. If you find that 
any of the propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff. 
IDJI 6.23-Accord and Satisfaction 
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OFFSET 
BECK PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 
The defendant has asserted the defense of offset. Offset requires the jury to offset 
amounts, if any, found to be due to the plaintiff against the amount found due to defendant, by 
deducting the smaller from the larger, and returning its verdict for the party in whose favor a 
balance is found due. 
Shinn v. Smith, 81 Idaho 57, 60, 336 P.2d 690 (1959). 
INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE 
BECK PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 
The defendant has asserted the defense of independent intervening cause. An independent 
intervening cause is a new and independent cause which breaks the causal cOlU1ection between 
the original wrong and the injury. If you find that the conduct of the plaintiff or a arty was in fact 
the cause of damages, as opposed to the conduct of Defendants', then you should not award such 
damages to plaintiff. 
lvfeyer v. Brown. 91 Idaho 369, 371, 421 P.2d 740 (1966). 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. ISB No. 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
414 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Telefax: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendants, Doyle Beck, 
and Kirk Woolf 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., 
An Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL 
AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability corporation, DOYLE 
BECK, an individual, and KIRK WOOLF, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV -06-7097 
) 
) DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S 
) REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL 
) JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE ) 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL ) 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
Corporation, DOYLE BECK, an individual, ) 
and KIRK WOOLF, an individual, ) 
DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL JURY 
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) 
Counterclaimants, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, and TRA VIS WATERS, ) 
an individual, ) 
) 
Counter-defendants. ) 
COMES NOW, defendant, Kirk Woolf, by and through counsel of record, Bryan D. 
Smith, Esq., of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, and pursuant to the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, respectfully requests the court to instruct the jury with the attached requested 
jury instructions numbered 13 through 17 
These instructions are in addition to the jury instructions requested by all other parties to 
which Kirk Woolf has not objected. 
Defendant specifically reserves the right to withdraw any of these instructions, or to 
submit, revise or supplement these instructions to conform to proof presented at the time of trial. 
Moreover, defendant reserves the right to object to the jury instructions filed by the 
DATED this '}--<i f::::;;ebrumy, 2009, 
plaintiff. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, 
PLLC ____ ------____ __ 
By: ----""=---,f-
Bryan D. S 
Attomeys for Defendant Kirk Woolf 
DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL JURY 
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CERTIFI~~EOFSERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J-.- ~a~'ebruary, 20091 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS to be served by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it 
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or 
overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
[~.Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ J))'vernight Delivery [ 1 Hand Delivery 
[ J Courthouse Mail Box 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq. 
Lance J. Schuster, Esq. 
John M. Avondet, Esq. 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Mark R. Fuller, Esq. 
Daniel Beck, Esq. 
FULLER & CARR 
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201 
P. O. Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935 
DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS - Page 3 
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
WOOLF PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. This 
form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you 
now. 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (COUNT III--SEWER CONNECTION) 
Question No.1: Did Woolf know a fact that Printcraft did not know? 
Answer to Question No.1: Y es [~ No[~ 
Question No.2: \Vas the fact so vital that ifthe mistake were mutual the contract would be 
voidable? 
Answer to Question No.2: Yes [~ No[_J 
Question No.3: Did Woolf know that Printcraft did not know the fact? 
Answer to Question No.3: Yes [_~ No[~ 
If you answered "No" to any question between 1-3, then you should skip to question . If 
you answered "Yes to each question between 1-3, then continue to the next question. 
If you answered "Yes" to questions No. 23-25, then Woolf had a duty to disclose a fact. Woolf 
's failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not exist. For 
the following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Woolf. 
Question No.4: Was the implied statement false? 
Answer to Question No.4: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No.5: Was the implied statement material? 
Answer to Question No.5: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No.6: Did Woolfknow the implied statement was false, or was Woolf unaware of 
whether the implied statement was true? 
Answer to Question No.6: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No.7: Was Woolf unaware that the implied statement was false? 
Answer to Question No.7: Yes [ __ ] No[~ 
Question No.8: Did Woolf intend for Printcraft to rely upon the implied statement and act upon 
it in a manner reasonably contemplated? 
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Answer to Question No.8: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No.9: Did Woolf rely upon the truth of the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No.9: Yes L~ No[~ 
Question No. 10: Was Printcraft's reliance reasonable under all ofthe circumstances? 
Answer to Question No. 10: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 11: Did Printcraft suffer damages which were proximately caused be reliance on 
the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No. 11: Yes [~ No[_J 
If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 4-11, then you should skip to question 
__ . If you answered "Yes" to each and every question from question 4-11, then continue to 
answer questions 12 and 13. 
Question No. 12: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Printcraft? 
Answer to Question No. 12: 
Question No. 13: What is the amount of damages proven by Printcraft which were proximately 
caused by Woolf s fraudulent non-disclosure? 
Answer to Question No. 13: We award the following amount of damages: 
FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (COUNT IV--SEWER CAPACITY) 
Question No. 14: Did Woolf know a fact that Print craft did not know? 
Answer to Question No. 14: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 15: Was the fact so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be 
voidable? 
Answer to Question No. 15: Yes L~ No[~ 
Question No. 16: Did Woolf know that Printcraft did not know the fact? 
Answer to Question No. 16: Yes [~ No[~ 
If you answered "No" to any question between 1-3, then you should skip to question __ . If 
you answered "Yes to each question between 1-3, then continue to the next question. 
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If you answered "Yes" to questions No, 23-25, then Woolf had a duty to disclose a fact. Woolf 
's failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not exist. For 
the following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Woolf. 
Question No. 17: Was the implied statement false? 
Answer to Question No. 17: Yes [_] No [_1 
Question No. 18: Was the implied statement material? 
Answer to Question No. 18: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 19: Did Woolf know the implied statement was false, or was Woolf unaware of 
whether the implied statement was true? 
Answer to Question No. 19: Yes L-.J No[~ 
Question No. 20: Was Woolf unaware that the implied statement was false? 
Answer to Question No. 21: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 22: Did Woolf intend for Printcraft to rely upon the implied statement and act 
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated? 
Answer to Question No. 22: Yes [~ No L-.J 
Question No. 23: Did Woolf rely upon the truth of the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No. 23: Yes [_] No [_1 
Question No. 24: Was Printcraft's reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances? 
Answer to Question No. 24: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 25: Did Printcraft suffer damages which were proximately caused be reliance on 
the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No. 25: Yes [~ No[~ 
If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 4-11, then you should skip to question 
_' If you answered "Yes" to each and every question from question 4-11, then continue to 
answer questions 12 and 13, 
Question No. 26: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Printcraft? 
Answer to Question No. 26: 
Question No. 27: What is the amount of damages proven by Printcraft which were proximately 
caused by Woolf s fraudulent non-disclosure? 
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Answer to Question No. 27: We award the following amount of damages: 
FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (COUNT V--THIRD PARTY BENKFICIARY 
UTILITY AGREEMENT AND RULES AND REGULATIONS) 
Question No. 28: Did Woolf know a fact that Printcraft did not know? 
Answer to Question No. 28: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 29: Was the fact so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be 
voidable? 
Answer to Question No. 29: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 30: Did Woolf know that Printcraft did not know the fact? 
Answer to Question No. 31: Yes [~ No[~ 
If you answered "No" to any question between 1-3, then you should skip to question ___ . If 
you answered "Yes to each question between 1-3, then continue to the next question. 
If you answered "Yes" to questions No. 23-25, then Woolf had a duty to disclose a fact. Woolf 
's failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not exist. For 
the following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Woolf. 
Question No. 32: Was the implied statement false? 
Answer to Question No. 33: Yes [~ No[_] 
Question No. 34: Was the implied statement material? 
Answer to Question No. 34: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 35: Did Woolf know the implied statement was false, or was Woolf unaware of 
whether the implied statement was true? 
Answer to Question No. 36: Yes [_] No[~ 
Question No. 37: Was Woolf unaware that the implied statement was false? 
Answer to Question No. 37: Yes [ __ ] No[~ 
Question No. 38: Did Woolf intend for Printcraft to rely upon the implied statement and act 
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated? 
Answer to Question No. 39: Yes No[~ 
Question No. 40: Did Woolf rely upon the truth of the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No. 41: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 42: Was Printcraft's reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances? 
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Answer to Question No. 43: Yes [~ No[~ 
Question No. 44: Did Printcraft suffer damages which were proximately caused be reliance on 
the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No. 45: Yes l~ No[~ 
If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 4-11, then you should skip to question 
. If you answered "Yes" to each and every question from question 4-11, then continue to 
answer questions 12 and 13. 
Question No. 46: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Printcraft? 
Answer to Question No. 47: 
Question No. 48: What is the amount of damages proven by Printcraft which were proximately 
caused by Woolfs fraudulent non-disclosure? 
Answer to Question No. 49: We award the following amount of damages: 
17 0 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 
WOOLF'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___ _ 
An agreement of compromise and settlement is a merger and bar of all pre-existing 
claims \vhich the parties intended to settle thereby. The compromise agreement becomes the sole 
source and measure of the rights of the parties involved in the previously existing controversy. 
If you find that the pmiies in good faith entered into an agreement compromising and 
settling their adverse claims then the settlement agreement is a complete defense to any action 
based upon any issues resolved by the settlement agreement. 
Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 542, 347 P.2d 341 (1959) 
Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 625,151 P.3d 818 (2007) 
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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
WOOLF PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 
The defendant has asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction. An accord and 
satisfaction is a new contract which discharges the rights and obligations created by a previous 
contract. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. A bona fide dispute existed between the paIiies as to the performance due under the 
original contract; 
2. The defendant offered some stated performance in full satisfaction of the obligation due 
under the original contract; 
3. The plaintiff accepted the performance offered, and understood or reasonably should 
have understood, that it constituted full satisfaction of the obligation due under the 
original contract. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the 
foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. If you find that 
any of the propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff. 
IDJI 6.23-Accord and Satisfaction 
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OFFSET 
WOOLF PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. __ _ 
The defendant has asselied the defense of offset. Offset requires the jury to offset 
amounts, if any, found to be due to the plaintiff against the amount found due to defendant, by 
deducting the smaller from the larger, and returning its verdict for the pmiy in whose favor a 
balance is found due. 
Shinn v. Smith. 81 Idaho 57, 60, 336 P.2d 690 (1959). 
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INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE 
WOOLF PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
The defendant has asserted the defense of independent intervening cause. An independent 
intervening cause is a new and independent cause which breaks the causal connection between 
the original wrong and the injury. If you find that the conduct of the plaintiff or a miy was in fact 
the cause of damages, as opposed to the conduct of Defendants', then you should not award such 
damages to plaintiff. 
NJeyer v. Brown, 91 Idaho 369, 371, 421 P.2d 740 (1966). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, 
Idaho corporation, 
INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
an ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUNNYSIDE 
INC., an 
SUNNYSIDE 
PARK UTILITIES, 
Idaho corporation, 
PARK OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability corporation, DOYLE 
BECK, an individual, and KIRK 
WOOLF, an individual. 
Defendants. 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
and SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability 
corporation. 
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v. 
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SUNNYSIDE'S OBJECTIONS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
SUNNYSIDE'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1 
COME NOW the Defendants, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., an 
Idaho corporation, and Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company (hereafter collectively 
"Sunnyside") and file Sunnyside's Objections to Plaintiff's 
Proposed Jury Instructions. Sunnyside does not object to the 
instructions not discussed herein. 
I. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.7 
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction NO.7 is asserted to be the 
IDJI 2.30.2 proximate cause instruction. However, Printcraft fails 
to identify that Printcraft has modified the stock instruction by 
substituting the word "negligent" for "fraudulent" in the second 
paragraph of the instruction. Printcraft has no claim for fraud 
and this instruction does not address non-disclosure. Jury may be 
confused and misled by this instruction. 
II. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No.8 is a modified version 
of the IDJI 4.60 affirmative fraud instruction. Printcraft has 
failed to cite any case law which would support the numerous 
modifications that Printcraft has introduced into the stock 
instruction and instead changes the stock propositions including 
subparts 1,2,3,4,5, and 9. There is no support for any of these 
modifications in the cited case law, which all follow the standard 
IDJI instruction 4.60 and are cited in the comments of such 
standard instruction. 
III. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.9 
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Printcraft's Proposed Instruction NO.9 attempts to eliminate 
any need for Printcraft to prove any intent by the defendants. 
Printcraft's sole source of authority for this proposed jury 
instruction comes from dicta in a footnote to Country Cove Dev., 
Inc. v. Myron, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288, 294 (2006). In 
country Cove, the plaintiff argued that because the defendant had 
violated its obligations as a fiduciary, the plaintiff did not 
need to prove all of the elements of fraud. 143 Idaho at 601. The 
Court stated that "[t]he gist of a constructive fraud finding is 
to avoid the need to prove intent (i.e., knowledge of falsity or 
intent to induce reliance), since it is inferred directly from the 
relationship and the breach. II Id. The Court also noted that the 
authority that it was commenting on " ... treats constructive fraud 
essentially as a synonym for breach of fiduciary duty. II Id. 
However, the Appellate Court in Country Cove, made no 
determination of this issue, holding that it was not raised before 
the reply brief and would not be considered on appeal. This Court 
has previously held that there is no fiduciary relationship or 
relationship of trust and confidence in this case. See Memorandum 
Decision and Order entered August 31, 2007, pg. 14 and Memorandum 
Decision and Order entered February 12, 2009, pg. 5, fn. 1. 
Furthermore, the third prong of Sowards (unlike the first 
prong dealing with fiduciary relationships), explicitly requires 
Printcraft to prove knowledge by the defendants. Sowards v. 
Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 707, 8 P.3d 1245 (2000). Because there is 
no fiduciary relationship between the parties from which knowledge 
of falsity or intent to induce reliance could be inferred (the 
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parties only "bumped into" each other five times between 2001 and 
January 23, 2006 when Printcraft moved into the building), 
Printcraft must still be required to prove each and every element 
of fraudulent non-disclosure including knowledge of falsity and 
intent to induce reliance. 
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction NO.9 should not be given 
to the jury because it is unsupported by any applicable Idaho case 
law specific to the facts of this case. The dicta in Country Cove 
must not be allowed to overrule numerous other cases requiring 
proof of both knowledge of falsity and intent to induce reliance. 
IV. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No. 10 is duplicative of 
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No.5, which is IDJI 1.24.1. " A 
trial court need not give a requested instruction, however, even 
if it is a correct statement of the law, if the subject matter is 
sufficiently covered by other instructions given to the jury. II 
State v. Wright, Docket No. 34017 (Ct.App. 2-6-2009) (referencing 
State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 511, 129 P.3d 1258, 1260 (Ct.App. 
2005). There simply is no reason to give this instruction as it is 
already adequately covered by another instruction. 
V. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No. 11 fails to include any 
definition of materiality. Both IDJI 6.08.5 (Interpretation of 
contract materiality) and Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616 (1998), 
contain a definition of materiality in addition to simply stating 
that ,,[t] he term 'material fact' refers to the importance of the 
misrepresentation or omitted fact In determining a plaintiff's 
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course of action." 
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's Proposed Instruction No. 
11 should not be given and instead the Court should instruct the 
jury regarding materiality by giving IDJI 6.08.5, set forth in 
Sunnyside's proposed instruction No. 10. 
VI. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No. 12 is an incomplete 
statement of the duty to disclose and is unnecessary if a proper 
duty to disclose instruction based upon Sowards v. Rathbun, 8 P.3d 
1245 (Idaho 2000) is given as contained in Sunnyside's proposed 
Instructions No. 2,4,6, and 8. 
While Printcraft's proposed instruction is a quote from G & M 
Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., it is incomplete and misleading because it 
does not address the elements of a duty to disclose. In G & M 
Farms, the Court analyzed knowledge of the defendant and 
specifically held that "knowledge of these operational and design 
defects was known only to Lindsay and discoverable by G & M Farms 
only after purchase and installation of the extensive irrigation 
system." 119 Idaho 514, 521, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). The analysis 
conducted in G & M Fanns is identical to the analysis in the third 
prong of Sowards. A duty to disclose jury instruction in this case 
should be based upon the third prong of Sowards. 
VII. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No. 13 claims to be based 
upon Sowards v. Rathbun, however it is not the standard set forth 
in Sowards. It is established by prior orders in this case that 
the first two prongs of Sowards do not apply to Printcraft' s 
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claims. See Memorandum Decision and Order, August 31, 2007, pg. 
14. Sunnyside asserts that the third prong of Sowards should be 
given as it is written in Sowards, if the Court determines that 
the existence of a duty to disclose is an issue for the jury to 
decide. The third prong of Sowards states that a duty to disclose 
may exist: " ... if a fact known by one party and not the other is so 
vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be 
voidable, and the party knowing the fact also knows that the other 
does not know it." Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 707, 8 P.3d 
1245 (2000); See Sunnyside's Proposed Instructions No.2, 4, 6, 
and 8. Printcraft's misstatement of the standard required by the 
third prong of Sowards eliminates significant portions of the 
proof Printcraft must establish in order for a duty to disclose to 
exist. Printcraft should be required to establish each part of the 
third prong of Sowards. Sunnyside objects to any effort to reduce 
the burden of proof mandated by Sowards to create a duty to 
disclose. 
VIII. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No. 14 is merely 
duplicative of Proposed Instruction No. 13 and unnecessary. 
Furthermore, the instruction fails to note the limiting language 
in the following sentence: "But such liability is premised upon a 
duty to disclose between parties to a transaction. II Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). Also instructive is the 
following footnote in Chiarella: 
The dissent of MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN suggests that the 
'special facts' doctrine may be applied to find that silence 
constitutes fraud where one party has superior information to 
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another. This Court has never so held ... The decision in Strong 
v. Repide was premised upon the fiduciary duty bet.ween the 
corporate insider and the shareholder. 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, fn. 10. (Citations 
omitted; emphasis added). Chiarella v. United States, addressed a 
fiduciary duty under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and would fall under the first prong of Sowards, which is 
not applicable here. See Memorandum Decision and Order, August 31, 
2 0 07, pg. 14. 
The few words set forth in Proposed Instruction No. 14 do not 
explain to the jury the nature and scope of Sunnyside's duty to 
disclose, if any, or the elements of fraud by non-disclosure. Nor 
does the instruction suggest that a confidential relationship is 
required to establish such a duty under the first prong of 
Sowards, or that the Court has previously determined that such a 
confidential relationship does not exist in this case as a matter 
of law. 
IX. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 15 AND NO. 16 
Printcraft's proposed instructions 15 and 16 are simply an 
attempt to convince the jury that the actual flows from Printcraft 
were 20 gallons per day per employee because Printcraft does not 
have any evidence of resulting flows. "[O]nly jury instructions 
that are pertinent to the pleadings and the evidence should be 
given. If Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co. / 145 Idaho 892, 899, 188 
P.3d 834 (2008). The septic system was not designed or constructed 
specifically for Printcraft. There is no claim or cause of action 
that suggests that the septic system was improperly designed when 
it was constructed in 1996. At that time, Sunnyside had no idea 
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that Printcraft would ever consider moving into the subdivision. 
Printcraft has never asserted that the system was not designed ln 
accordance with IDAPA. Furthermore, the inspection and approval of 
the system establishes that the system was init ly designed and 
constructed in accordance with IDAPA. (Notably, the approved 
design used on the 1996 permit and inspection was not 20 gpd). The 
Court's February 12, 2009 Order states as follows: 
IDAPA 58.01.03.007 specifically relates to design and 
construction standards, which applied at the time the septic 
system was originally constructed. While this septic system 
may have been in violation of the design requirements if 
originally designed and built for Printcraft, the connection 
at issue in Printcraft's motion is an 'additional' connection 
made after the completion of the design and construction. 
As such, the Court finds that Printcraft's connection is 
governed by IDAPA 58.01.03.004.04. 
February 12, 2009 Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 5 (Emphasis 
Added). Because connection of the building occupied by Printcraft 
in 2005 was an "additional" connection and the septic system was 
not originally designed and built for Printcraft, the original 
design of the septic system is irrelevant. The jury should not be 
instructed on an issue that is irrelevant. 
Printcraft's proposed jury instructions No. 15 and 16 will 
cause the jury to believing that the resulting flows into the 
system were 20 gallons per person per day. Instructions should not 
be given if the requested instruction constitutes an impermissible 
comment as to the evidence. See State v. Edney, 145 Idaho 694, 
697, 183 P.3d 782 (Ida.App. 2008) ("A requested instruction must 
be given if: (1) it properly states the governing law; (2) a 
reasonable view of at least some of the evidence would support the 
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defendant's legal theory; (3 ) the subject of the requested 
instruction is not addressed adequately by other jury 
instructions; and (4 ) the requested instruction does not 
consti tute an impermissible comment as to the evidence. "). IDAPA 
58.01.03.007 is not the law governing Printcraft's connection. See 
Memorandum Decision and Order, February 12, 2009, p. 5. Neither 
Printcraft's Proposed Instructions No. 15 or 16 should be given to 
the jury. 
X. PROPOSED INSTURCTION NO. 17 
Printcraft's proposed instruction No. 17 is not relevant to 
any issue still remaining in this litigation. Sunnyside has 
already been granted summary judgment on Sunnyside I s cause of 
action for breach of contract. See Memorandum Decision and Order 
April 23, 2008, p. 9. Furthermore, the correspondence between the 
parties established that the only relevant definition of "process 
waste" was Sunnyside's definition. See Letter of Lane Erickson, 
dated September 26, 2006. (Sunnyside's Exhibit AN.) The jury is to 
be instructed on the law by the Court, however, there is no 
requirement that the jury be instructed on what the law is not. 
IDAPA 58.01.03 does not constitute the entirety of Idaho law, 
which includes all extant statutes I case law and regulations. 
Printcraft cannot establish that these terms are not elsewhere 
defined in the law of Idaho. 
XI. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
The jury should not be allowed to consider the "Total Cost of 
the Lease Discounted to Present Value" because no evidence of such 
damages were produced by Printcraft prior to the discovery 
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deadline. On February II, 2009 Printcraft for the first time 
submitted written lease agreements and a claim for the total cost 
of the lease discounted to present value, supported by an untimely 
disclosed expert opinion of David M. Smith, CPA. This evidence is 
the subject of a Motion in Limine. 
Furthermore, subpart three jointly refers to all defendants, 
making all defendants liable for the alleged non-disclosures of 
the others. Sunnyside further objects to Printcraft's use of the 
terms "fraudulent misconduct" when Printcraft's claim is for 
"fraud by non-disclosure." No case law is presented to support 
these elements of economic damage. IDJI 9.01 is intended to 
address personal inj ury claims, not claims for fraud by non-
disclosure. 
XII. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No. 20 only relates to the 
lease claim in David Smith's Supplemental Expert Report, which was 
first submitted to Defendants after the discovery deadline had 
passed. Printcraft should not be allowed to present evidence of 
ten years' of lease payments and therefore this instruction is 
irrelevant. without the untimely Supplemental Opinion of David M. 
Smith, which should be excluded, the jury will have no expert 
opinion on which to base a present cash value determination. 
XIII. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
Printcraft has added the following sentence to the end of the 
model jury instruction: "These damages are called 'punitive 
damages. '" Printcraft provides no explanation for why it adds this 
sentence, and it does not appear to serve any purpose. Neither 
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this sentence nor the IDJI 9.20 title should be included on the 
instructions submitted to the jury. 
Furthermore, there is no allegation that any non-disclosure 
was the result of malice, affirmative fraud, oppression, or 
outrageous conduct by Sunnyside. The instruction should require a 
finding that 'these acts were fraud by non-disclosure,' the sole 
basis of recovery pled by Printcraft. See Third Amended Complaint, 
Counts 3, 4, and 5. 
XIV. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No. 23 IS merely 
duplicative of the model jury instruction regarding punitive 
damages. Furthermore, in addition to a fraudulent non-disclosure, 
the acts must be an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of 
conduct. Printcraft' s Instruction No. 23 should not be given to 
the jury. 
XV. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No. 24 is covered by IDJI 
9.20 which is already Printcraft' s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 
22. Submitting both Proposed Jury Instructions will simply confuse 
the jury. The proper standard is IDJI 9.20, modified for 
fraudulent non-disclosure as pled by Printcraft. (See Section XIII 
above) . 
XVI. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
IDJI 9.20.5 misstates Idaho law by stating that "the law 
provides no mathematical formula by which such damages are to be 
calculated, If by reason of the 2003 amendment codified in Idaho 
Code Section 6-1604. Although this calculation should not be 
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revealed to the jury, the provision in the instruction denying 
that such law exists should be removed from the instruction, and 
the final sentence should begin: "Any award of punitive damages 
must bear ... " so as not to mislead the jury. 
XVII. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 26 and 27 
Printcraft's Proposed Instructions No. 26 and 27 state an 
affirmative defense to a breach of contract action based on the 
defense of fraud or the defense of fraudulent non-disclosure. 
Sunnyside has already been granted Summary Judgment on its claim 
for breach of contract. See Memorandum Decision and Order, April 
23, 2008, p. 9. Printcraft's liability on Sunnyside's claim for 
breach of contract is not an issue the jury will decide, so the 
jury does not need to be instructed on affirmative defenses to the 
contract. 
Furthermore, Printcraft has significantly modified IDJI 
6.27.1, omitting the element of falsity and modifying the reliance 
element. Printcraft' s Instruction No. 27 places the burden of 
proving Printcraft' s defense upon Sunnyside: " ... the defendant has 
the burden of proving ... ". Subpart 3 requires defendants to prove 
that "defendants knew that defendant was unaware of the true fact" 
which is not logical. Subpart 4 requires Sunnyside to prove that 
Sunnyside did not disclose a fact to Printcraft, intending that 
Sunnyside would act in ignorance of the fact, an element which is 
not part of any defense. Subpart 11, requiring Printcraft to offer 
to return any unjust enrichment benefits, has been omitted. 
Neither proposed instructions 26 or 27 should be given to the 
jury. 
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XVIII. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No. 28 claims to be IDJI 
6.40.1. However, Printcraft has modified the IJDI, adding language 
that "a director or officer of a company is an agent of the 
Company," without identifying that Printcraft's proposed 
instruction is a modification and without any authority for the 
modification. Sunnyside asserts that the unmodified IJDI 6.40.1 
should be given to the jury. See Sunnyside's Proposed Instruction 
No. 26. 
XIX. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 29 
This instruction quotes from AM JUR dicta contained in 
E.Iiopulos v. Knox, a case addressing statutory liability of 
directors of a bank. The language quoted refers to commission of 
an affirmative tort and Printcraft cites no authority that such 
liability attaches to non-disclosure. Printcraft' s proposed 
instruction modifies liability from "third person injured thereby" 
to the ambiguous term "inj ured people," seeking to expand the 
field from those persons reasonably expected by the directors to 
be affected, i.e. the parties to the transaction (in this case CTR 
Development, who paid for and acquired the connection and 
Sunnyside Park Utili ties) to all downstream "people" who may 
somehow be affected by the transaction. The jury will be misled as 
to both the directors' liability and the class of third parties 
governed by this AM JUR dicta, which is no part of the holding of 
Eliopulos. The actual holding of Eliopulos found no liability of 
any director of the bank under any statutory or common law theory. 
Proposed Instruction No. 29 is not the law in Idaho and should not 
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XX. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction 
duplicative of Proposed Instruction No. 
No. 30 is merely 
13. Furthermore, the 
existence of a duty is a legal determination for the Court. See 
Sunnyside's Pretrial Brief. If the Court believes that the 
existence of a duty to disclose is an issue for the jury to decide 
the Court should simply instruct the jury on factors to be 
considered under the third prong of Sowards. The record is clear 
that Printcraft purchased no property from defendants and owns no 
property in the subdivision. Printcraft was never a "prospective 
purchaser" and this instruction will confuse and mislead the jury. 
XXI. PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Printcraft's Proposed Special Verdict Form should not be 
given because it contains numerous errors. 
Printcraft's Proposed Special Verdict attempts to avoid 
proving the allegations of fraudulent non-disclosure made in the 
Third Amended Complaint and instead requires only proof that the 
various defendants "fraudulently fail [ed] to disclose material 
information about the septic system to Printcraft Press, Inc. 1/ 
Because fraud must be pled with particularity, Printcraft 1S 
limited to proving the particular allegations of fraud set forth 
in its Third Amended Complaint. The proposed Special Verdict form 
would expand Printcraft's claims beyond the pled fraudulent non-
disclosures to other "information" not specified in the complaint. 
The special verdict form given should be specific to each Count of 
Fraudulent Non-disclosures contained in Printcraft's Third Amended 
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In addition, the special verdict form for a fraudulent non-
disclosure cause of action must necessarily include all required 
elements. This is because the absence of anyone element is fatal 
to the claim. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 239, 
108 P.3d 380 (2005). As written, Printcraft's special verdict form 
will confuse the jury into believing that all Printcraft must 
prove is a (1) failure to disclose; (2)proximate cause; and (3) 
damages. Printcraft must establish, by clear and convincing 
evidence, (1) a duty to disclose; (2) a failure to disclose that is 
treated as an affirmative misrepresentation of the non-existence 
of the information that Printcraft claims should have been 
disclosed; (3) falsity; (4) materiality; (5) that Sunnyside knew 
about the falsity; (5) that Printcraft did not know about the 
falsity; (6) that Sunnyside intended for Printcraft to act upon 
the falsity in a manner reasonably contemplated; (7 ) that 
Printcraft did rely upon the non-disclosure; (8) that Printcraft's 
reliance was reasonable under all circumstances; (9) proximate 
cause; and (10) damages. (See IJDI 4.60; See also Bethlahmy v. 
Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 59, 415 P.2d 698 (1966)). 
The special verdict form for the fraudulent non-disclosure 
causes of action must be specific to the causes of action pled in 
Printcraft's complaint. Sunnyside is not prepared or willing to 
try any other fraudulent non-disclosure claim. Furthermore, 
because of the nature of a fraud claim, the Special Verdict Form 
must specifically identify all ten elements of the claim 
individually. See Sunnyside's Proposed Special Verdict form 
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submitted on February 24, 2009. 
DATED this day of February, 2009. 
Mark R. Fuller 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 4411 
B. 1. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
414 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Telefax: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendants, Doyle Beck, 
and Kirk Woolf 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., 
An Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL 
AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability corporation, DOYLE 
BECK, an individual, and KIRK WOOLF, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV -06-7097 
) 
) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
) SUPPLEMENTAL JURY 
) INSTRUCTIONS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE ) 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL ) 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
Corporation, DOYLE BECK, an individual, ) 
and KIRK WOOLF, an individual, ) 
) 
Counterclaimants, ) 
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) 
v. ) 
) 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS WATERS, ) 
an individual, ) 
) 
Counter-defendants. ) 
COME NOW the Defendants, Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf (hereafter collectively "Beck 
and Woolf') and file this Brief in Support of Supplemental Jury InstllJctions. 
JRCP 51(a)(1) states that "No later than five (5) days before the commencement of any trial 
by jury, any party may file written requests that the cOUli instllJc1 the jury on the lay\! as set forth in 
such request..." FUlihennore, IRCP 51(a)(1) allows the court to "reasonably permit any pmiy to 
file and serve written requests for instllJctions at any time up to and including the close of the 
evidence." There are two possible grounds for allowance oflate disclosure of jury instructions: (1) 
matters arising during the trial of the action which could not reasonably have been anticipated by 
the pm"ty requesting such instllJctions; or (2) if the instllJctions "were overlooked in the original 
instructions." IRCP 51(a)(1). 
The Court's order required the parties to file proposed jury instllJctions. However, thc 
Court's order specifically stated "The parties need not submit IDJl2 instllJction number 1.01 
tlu'ough 1.43." See Order dated July 8, 2008. Based on that instllJction Beck and Woolf did not 
submit a proposed special verdict form based on IDJI 1.43.1. Beck m1d Woolf now submit a 
proposed special verdict fonn in accordm1ce with IRCP 51(a)(1). 
FUlihennore, Beck and Woolf have fOUl1d that they overlooked jury instllJctions regarding 
affinnative defenses contained in paragraphs 114 (settlement agreement), 116 (accord m1d 
satisfaction), 122 (offset), and 124 (independent intervening cause). Beck m1d Woolf now submit 
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proposed jury instructions on these issues and asks that the Court reasonably pennit them to conect 
their o\vn enor in overlOOkiltt~ instructions. 
DATED this 2- C1day of February, 2009. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSQCIATE 
. -----~-- --"..~ 
--
Blyan D. 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf 
CERTIFICATE nVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ Lj day of February, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT nF SUPPLEMENTAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS to be served by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight 
delivery, addressed to the following: 
[~Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] SJ:vernight Delivery [ -r Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq. 
Lance J. Schuster, Esq. 
John M. Avondet, Esq. 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Mark R. Fuller, Esq. 
Daniel Beck, Esq. 
FULLER & CARR 
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201 
P. O. Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935 
~~~ 
Bryan D. Smitl 
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698) 
DANIEL R. BECK (ISB No. 7237) 
FULLER & CARR 
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201 
P . O. Box 5 0 93 5 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405-0935 
TELEPHONE: ( 2 08) 524 - 54 00 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS/COUNTER CLAIJVTANTS SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC. 
AND SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, 
Idaho corporation, 
INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
an ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PARK UTILITIES, 
Idaho corporation, 
SUNNYSIDE 
INC., an 
SUNNYSIDE 
ASSOCIATION, 
corporation, 
INDUSTRIAL 
PARK OWNERS 
INC. , an Idaho 
SUNNYSIDE 
AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability corporation, DOYLE 
BECK, an individual, and KIRK 
WOOLF, an individual. 
Defendants. 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
and SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability 
corporation. 
Counterclaimants, 
v. 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS 
WATERS, an individual. 
Counter-defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-06-7097 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
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COME NOW the Defendants, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., an 
Idaho corporation, and Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company (hereafter collectively 
"Sunnyside ll ) and file this Brief in Support of Supplemental Jury 
Instructions. 
IRCP 51(a) (1) states that "No later than five (5) days before 
the commencement of any trial by jury, any party may file written 
requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth 
in such request ... " Furthermore, IRCP 51 (a) (1) allows the court to 
"reasonably permit any party to file and serve written requests 
for instructions at any time up to and including the close of the 
evidence. II There are two possible grounds for allowance of late 
disclosure of jury instructions: (1) matters arising during the 
trial of the action which could not reasonably have been 
anticipated by the party requesting such instructions; or (2) if 
the instructions "were overlooked in the original instructions." 
IRCP 51 (a) (1) . 
The Court's order required the parties to file proposed jury 
instructions. However, the Court's order specifically stated "The 
parties need not submit IDJI2 instruction number 1.01 through 
1.43. II See Order dated July 8, 2008. Based on that instruction 
Sunnyside did not submit a proposed special verdict form based on 
IDJI 1.43.1. Sunnyside now submits a proposed special verdict form 
in accordance with IRCP 51(a) (1). 
Furthermore, Sunnyside has found that it overlooked jury 
instructions regarding affirmative defenses contained in 
paragraphs 114 (settlement agreement) , 116 (accord and 
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1806 
satisfaction), 122 (offset), and 124 (independent intervening 
cause). Sunnyside now submits proposed jury instructions on these 
issues and asks that the Court reasonably permit Sunnyside to 
correct its own error in overlooking these instructions. 
DATED this day of February, 2009. 
OJ6Y Danlel R. Bec-ok----------
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the 
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed 
below on this day of February, 2009: 
Document Served: 
Attorneys Served: 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Bryan Smith 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731 
Fax: 529-4166 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
__ U.S. Mail 
Facsimile ~-
__ Hand Delivery 
__ U.S. Mail 
)L Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
FULLER & CARR 
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698) 
DANIEL R. BECK (ISB No. 7237) 
FULLER & CARR 
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201 
P.O. Box 50935 
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-0935 
TELEPHONE: (208)524-5400 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., AND SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho) 
corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK ) 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an) 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE) 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL) 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, DOYLE BECK, an Individual, ) 
and KIRK WOOLF, an Individual, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
) 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE ) 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL) 
PARK, LLC., an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, DOYLE BECK, an Individual) 
and KIRK WOOLF, an Individual, ) 
) 
Counterclaimants, ) 
) 
v. 
Case No. CV-06-7097 
DEFENDANTS'SUPPLEMENTAL 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
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PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation and TRAVIS WATERS, an ) 
Individual, ) 
) 
Counter-defendants. ) 
) 
--------------------------) 
COMES NOW, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., and Sunnyside Industrial and 
Professional Park, LLC., by their counsel of record, Mark R. Fuller, and respectfully 
requests the Court to give the attached supplemental Jury Instructions numbered 31 
through ---=-~,_ to the jury. 
DATED this 
~ L4 day of February, 2009. 
Mark R. Fuller 
Fuller & Carr 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the following 
I/M... 
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below on this l" day of 
February, 2009: 
Document Served: 
Attorneys Served: 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Bryan Smith, Esq. 
SMITH DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Fails, ID 83405 
DEFENDANTS'SUPPLEMENTAL 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
__ U.S. Mail 
~ Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ U.S. Mail 
~ Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
Mark R. Fuller 
FULLER & CARR 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 
SUNNYSIDE'S INSTRUCTION NO'--t.L-f--
An agreement of compromise and settlement is a merger and bar of all pre-existing claims 
which the parties intended to settle thereby. The compromise agreement becomes the sole source and 
measure of the rights of the parties involved in the previously existing controversy. 
If you find that the parties in good faith entered into an agreement compromising and settling 
their adverse claims then the settlement agreement is a complete defense to any action based upon any 
issues resolved by the settlement agreement. 
Wilson v. Bogert 81 Idaho 535, 542, 347 P.2d 341 (1959) 
Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 625, 151 P.3d 818 (2007) 
APPROVED __ _ 
REJECTED __ _ 
MODIFIED __ _ 
OTHER __ _ 
Page 6 of 9 
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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
SUNNYSIDE'S INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
The defendant has asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction. An accord and satisfaction is 
a new contract which discharges the rights and obligations created by a previous contract. The 
defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. A bona fide dispute existed between the parties as to the performance due under the original 
contract; 
2. The defendant offered some stated performance in full satisfaction ofthe obligation due under 
the original contract; 
3. The plaintiff accepted the performance offered, and understood or reasonably should have 
understood, that it constituted full satisfaction of the obligation due under the original contract. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the foregoing 
propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. If you find that any of the 
propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff. 
IOJI 6.23-Accord and Satisfaction 
APPROVED __ _ 
REJECTED __ _ 
MODIFIED __ _ 
OTHER __ _ 
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OFFSET 
SUNNYSIDE'S INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
The defendant has asserted the defense of offset. Offset requires the jury to offset amounts, if 
any, found to be due to the plaintiffs against the amount found due to defendants, by deducting the 
smaller from the larger, and returning its verdict for the party in whose favor a balance is found due. 
Shinn v. Smith, 81 Idaho 57, 60, 336 P.2d 690 (1959). 
APPROVED __ _ 
REJECTED __ _ 
MODIFIED __ _ 
OTHER __ _ 
Page 8 of 9 
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INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE 
SUNNYSIDE'S INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
The defendant has asserted the defense of independent intervening cause. An independent 
intervening cause is a new and independent cause which breaks the causal connection between the 
original wrong and the injury. If you find that the conduct of Printcraft or a third party was in fact the 
cause of damages, as opposed to the conduct of Defendants, then you should not award such damages 
to Printcraft. 
Meyer v. Brown, 91 Idaho 369, 371,421 P.2d 740 (1966). 
APPROVED __ _ 
REJECTED __ _ 
MODIFIED __ _ 
OTHER __ _ 
Page 9 of 9 
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
SUNNYSIDE'S INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. This form 
consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you now. 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Question No.1: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities prove additional damages, which were not previously 
awarded by the Court, for Printcraft's breach of the contract? 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes [_1 No [_1 
If you answered this question "No" skip question 2. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the 
next question. 
Question No.2: What is the amount of additional damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities for 
Printcraft's breach of the contract? 
Answer to Question No.2: We award the following amount of damages: ________ _ 
BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
Question No.3: Did Printcraft act in good faith and deal fairly with Sunnyside Park Utilities in Printcraft's 
performance of the contract? 
Answer to Question No.3: Yes [_1 No [_1 
If you answered this question "No" skip question 4. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the 
next question. 
Question No.4: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities for Printcraft's 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
Answer to Question No.4: We award the following amount of damages: ________ _ 
TRESPASS 
Question No.5: Did Printcraft or Printcraft's agents go upon Sunnyside Park Utilities' land? 
Answer to Question No.5: Yes [~ No [_1 
Page 1 of 9 
1816 
If you answered this question "No" then there was no Trespass and you should skip question 6. If you 
answered this question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No.6: Did Printcraft have consent from Sunnyside Park Utilities to enter upon Sunnyside Park 
Utilities land? 
Answer to Question No.6: Yes [_1 No [_1 
If you answered this question "No" then there was no Trespass. If you answered this question "Yes," 
then you have found Printcraft committed Trespass. Continue to question No.7 to determine if the 
trespass was a Willful Trespass. 
Question No.7: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities' property posted with "No Trespassing" signs, spaced at 
intervals of not less than one (1) notice per six hundred sixty (660) feet along Sunnyside Park Utilities' 
property? 
Answer to Question No.7: Yes [_1 No [_1 
FRAUD 
The jury must find the following propositions to have been proven by clear and convincing evidence: 
Question No.8: Did Printcraft state a fact to Sunnyside Park Utilities? 
Answer to Question No.8: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No.9: Was the statement false? 
Answer to Question No.9: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No. 10: Was the statement material? 
Answer to Question No. 10: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No. 11: Did Printcraft know the statement was false, or was Printcraft unaware of whether the 
statement was true at the time the statement was made? 
Answer to Question No. 11: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No.12: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities unaware that the statement was false? 
Answer to Question No. 13: Yes [-1 No [_1 
Question No. 14: Did Printcraft intend for Sunnyside Park Utilities to rely upon the statement and act 
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated? 
Answer to Question No. 15: Yes [_1 No [-1 
Question No. 16: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities rely upon the truth of the statement? 
Page 2 of 9 
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Answer to Question No. 17: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No. 18: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities' reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances? 
Answer to Question No. 18: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No. 19: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities suffer damages which were proximately caused be 
reliance on the statement? 
Answer to Question No. 19: Yes [_1 No [_1 
If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 8-19 then Sunnyside Park Utilities has not 
proven fraud and you should skip to question 22. If you answered "Yes" to each and every question from 
question 8-19 then continue to answer questions 20 and 21. 
Question No. 20: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Sunnyside Park Utilities? 
Answer to Question No. 20: __________________________ _ 
Question No. 21: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities which were 
proximately caused by Printcraft's fraud? 
Answer to Question No. 21: We award the following amount of damages: ________ _ 
FRAUDULENT NON-DISClOSURE 
Question No. 22: Did Printcraft make a partial or ambiguous statement of fact which was misleading to 
Sunnyside Park Utilities? 
Answer to Question No. 22: Yes [_1 No [~ 
If you answered this question "No" answer questions 23-25. If you answered this question "Yes," skip 
questions 23-25 and begin answering question 26. 
Question No. 23: Did Printcraft know a fact that Sunnyside Park Utilities did not know? 
Answer to Question No. 23: Yes [_1 No [_] 
Question No. 24: Was the fact so vital that ifthe mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable? 
Answer to Question No. 24: Yes [_] No [_1 
Question No. 25: Did Printcraft know that Sunnyside Park Utilities did not know the fact? 
Answer to Question No. 25: Yes r_l No [_] 
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If you answered "No" to any question between 23-25 then there is no fraudulent non-disclosure and you 
should skip to question __ . If you answered "Yes to each question between 23-25 then continue to 
the next question. 
If you answered "Yes" to question No. 22 or questions No. 23-25 then Printcraft had a duty to disclose a 
fact. Printcraft's failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not 
exist. For the following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Printcraft. 
Question No. 26: Was the implied statement false? 
Answer to Question No. 26: Yes [_J No [_J 
Question No. 27: Was the implied statement material? 
Answer to Question No. 27: Yes [_J No [_J 
Question No. 28: Did Printcraft know the implied statement was false, or was Printcraft unaware of 
whether the implied statement was true? 
Answer to Question No. 28: Yes [_J No [_J 
Question No.29: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities unaware that the implied statement was false? 
Answer to Question No. 29: Yes LJ No [_J 
Question No. 30: Did Printcraft intend for Sunnyside Park Utilities to rely upon the implied statement 
and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated? 
Answer to Question No. 30: Yes [_J No [_J 
Question No. 31: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities rely upon the truth of the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No. 31: Yes LJ No [_J 
Question No. 32: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances? 
Answer to Question No. 32: Yes [_J No [ J 
Question No. 33: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities suffer damages which were proximately caused be 
reliance on the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No. 33: Yes LJ No [_J 
If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 26-33 then Sunnyside Park Utilities has not 
proven fraudulent non-disclosure and you should skip to question 36. If you answered "Yes" to each and 
every question from question 26-33 then continue to answer questions 34 and 35. 
Question No. 34: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Sunnyside Park Utilities? 
Answer to Question No. 34: _________________________ _ 
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Question No. 35: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities which were 
proximately caused by Printcraft's fraudulent non-disclosure? 
Answer to Question No. 35: We award the following amount of damages: ________ _ 
NUISANCE 
Question No. 36: ~id conduct by Printcraft constitute a nuisance? 
Answer to Question No. 36: Yes Ll No [_1 
If you answered this question "No" you are done. Sign the verdict as instructed and advise the bailiff. If 
you answered this question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 37: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities which were 
proximately caused by Printcraft's conduct which you found to be a nuisance? 
Answer to Question No. 37: We award the following amount of damages: ________ _ 
10JI 1.43.1 (Modified) 
APPROVED __ _ 
REJECTED __ _ 
MOOIFIED __ _ 
OTHER __ _ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ _ 
An agreement of compromise and settlement is a merger and bar of all pre-existing claims 
which the parties intended to settle thereby. The compromise agreement becomes the sole source and 
measure of the rights of the parties involved in the previously existing controversy. 
If you find that the parties in good faith entered into an agreement compromising and settling 
their adverse claims then the settlement agreement is a complete defense to any action based upon any 
issues resolved by the settlement agreement. 
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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The defendant has asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction. An accord and satisfaction is 
a new contract which discharges the rights and obligations created by a previous contract. The 
defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. A bona fide dispute existed between the parties as to the performance due under the original 
contract; 
2. The defendant offered some stated performance in full satisfaction of the obligation due under 
the original contract; 
3. The plaintiff accepted the performance offered, and understood or reasonably should have 
understood, that it constituted full satisfaction of the obligation due under the original contract. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the foregoing 
propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. If you find that any of the 
propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff. 
1822 
OFFSET 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The defendant has asserted the defense of offset. Offset requires the jury to offset amounts, if 
any, found to be due to the plaintiffs against the amount found due to defendants, by deducting the 
smaller from the larger, and returning its verdict for the party in whose favor a balance is found due. 
18°3 . 
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INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE 
I NSTRUCTION NO. 
The defendant has asserted the defense of independent intervening cause. An independent 
intervening cause is a new and independent cause which breaks the causal connection between the 
original wrong and the injury. If you find that the conduct of Printcraft or a third party was in fact the 
cause of damages, as opposed to the conduct of Defendants, then you should not award such damages 
to Printcraft. 
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. This form 
consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you now. 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Question No.1: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities prove additional damages, which were not previously 
awarded by the Court, for Printcraft's breach of the contract? 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes [_1 No [_1 
If you answered this question {{No" skip question 2. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the 
next question. 
Question No.2: What is the amount of additional damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities for 
Printcraft's breach of the contract? 
Answer to Question No.2: We award the following amount of damages: ________ _ 
BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
Question No.3: Did Printcraft act in good faith and deal fairly with Sunnyside Park Utilities in Printcraft's 
performance of the contract? 
Answer to Question No.3: Yes Ll No [_1 
If you answered this question "No" skip question 4. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the 
next question. 
Question No.4: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities for Printcraft's 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
Answer to Question No.4: We award the following amount of damages: ________ _ 
TRESPASS 
Question No.5: Did Printcraft or Printcraft's agents go upon Sunnyside Park Utilities' land? 
Answer to Question No.5: Yes [_1 No [_1 
If you answered this question "No" then there was no Trespass and you should skip question 6. If you 
answered this question {{Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No.6: Did Printcraft have consent from Sunnyside Park Utilities to enter upon Sunnyside Park 
Utilities land? 
Answer to Question No.6: Yes [_1 No [_1 
If you answered this question "No" then there was no Trespass. If you answered this question flYes/' 
then you have found Printcraft committed Trespass. Continue to question NO.7 to determine jf the 
trespass was a Willful Trespass. 
Question No.7: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities' property posted with "No Trespassing" signs, spaced at 
intervals of not less than one (1) notice per six hundred sixty (660) feet along Sunnyside Park Utilities' 
property? 
Answer to Question No.7: Yes [_1 No [_1 
FRAUD 
The jury must find the following propositions to have been proven by clear and convincing evidence: 
Question No.8: Did Printcraft state a fact to Sunnyside Park Utilities? 
Answer to Question No.8: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No.9: Was the statement false? 
Answer to Question No.9: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No. 10: Was the statement material? 
Answer to Question No. 10: Yes L1 No [_1 
Question No. 11: Did Printcraft know the statement was false, or was Printcraft unaware of whether the 
statement was true at the time the statement was made? 
Answer to Question No. 11: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No.12: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities unaware that the statement was false? 
Answer to Question No. l3: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No. 14: Did Printcraft intend for Sunnyside Park Utilities to rely upon the statement and act 
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated? 
Answer to Question No.1S: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No. 16: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities rely upon the truth ofthe statement? 
Answer to Question No. 17: Yes l_l No [_1 
Question No. 18: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities' reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances? 
Answer to Question No. 18: Yes [_1 No [_1 
1 8 ~l~ 
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Question No. 19: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities suffer damages which were proximately caused be 
reliance on the statement? 
Answer to Question No. 19: Yes [_] No [_] 
If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 8-19 then Sunnyside Park Utilities has not 
proven fraud and you should skip to question 22. If you answered "Yes" to each and every question from 
question 8-19 then continue to answer questions 20 and 21. 
Question No. 20: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Sunnyside Park Utilities? 
Answer to Question No. 20: _________________________ _ 
Question No. 21: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities which were 
proximately caused by Printcraft's fraud? 
Answer to Question No. 21: We award the following amount of damages: ________ _ 
FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE 
Question No. 22: Did Printcraft make a partial or ambiguous statement of fact which was misleading to 
Sunnyside Park Utilities? 
Answer to Question No. 22: Yes [_1 No [_] 
If you answered this question "No" answer questions 23-25. If you answered this question "Yes/' skip 
questions 23-25 and begin answering question 26. 
Question No. 23: Did Printcraft know a fact that Sunnyside Park Utilities did not know? 
Answer to Question No. 23: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No. 24: Was the fact so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable? 
Answer to Question No. 24: Yes [_1 No [---..--l 
Question No. 25: Did Printcraft know that Sunnyside Park Utilities did not know the fact? 
Answer to Question No. 25: Yes [_1 No [_J 
If you answered "No" to any question between 23-25 then there is no fraudulent non-disclosure and you 
should skip to question __ . If you answered "Yes to each question between 23-25 then continue to 
the next question. 
If you answered "Yes" to question No. 22 or questions No. 23-25 then Printcraft had a duty to disclose a 
fact. Printcraft's failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not 
exist. For the following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Printcraft. 
Question No. 26: Was the implied statement false? 
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Answer to Question No. 26: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No. 27: Was the implied statement material? 
Answer to Question No. 27: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No. 28: Did Printcraft know the implied statement was false, or was Printcraft unaware of 
whether the implied statement was true? 
Answer to Question No. 28: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No.29: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities unaware that the implied statement was false? 
Answer to Question No. 29: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No. 30: Did Printcraft intend for Sunnyside Park Utilities to rely upon the implied statement 
and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated? 
Answer to Question No. 30: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No. 31: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities rely upon the truth of the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No. 31: Yes [_1 No [_1 
Question No. 32: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances? 
Answer to Question No. 32: Yes Ll No [_1 
Question No. 33: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities suffer damages which were proximately caused be 
reliance on the implied statement? 
Answer to Question No. 33: Yes [ 1 No [_1 
If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 26-33 then Sunnyside Park Utilities has not 
proven fraudulent non-disclosure and you should skip to question 36. If you answered flYes" to each and 
every question from question 26-33 then continue to answer questions 34 and 35. 
Question No. 34: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Sunnyside Park Utilities? 
Answer to Question No. 34: _________________________ _ 
Question No. 35: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities which were 
proximately caused by Printcraft's fraudulent non-disclosure? 
Answer to Question No. 35: We award the following amount of damages: ________ _ 
NUISANCE 
Question No. 36: Did conduct by Printcraft constitute a nuisance? 
1828 
Answer to Question No. 36: Yes Ll No [_1 
If you answered this question "No" you are done. Sign the verdict as instructed and advise the bailiff. If 
you answered this question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
Question No. 37: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities which were 
proximately caused by Printcraft's conduct which you found to be a nuisance? 
Answer to Question No. 37: We award the following amount of damages: ________ _ 
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DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. an Idaho 
corporation, TRAVIS WATERS, an 
indi vidual, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual, 
KIRK WOOLF, an individual, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-06-7097 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft), through counsel of record, Beard 
St. Clair Gaffney PA, respectfully objects to the following proposed jury instructions 
submitted by the defendants. Printcraft reserves the right to further object at trial. To the 
extent any of the jury instructions submitted by any of the defendants' conflict with 
Plaintiff's Objections to Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions Page 1 
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instructions submitted by Printcraft, Printcraft objects to the defendants' instructions 011 
that basis and request that the COUlt utilize instructions submitted by Printcraft. 
DOYLE BECK'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1. Facts Not in Dispute-misstates the facts. 
2. Duty to Disclose-misstates the law and the requirements of Printcraft's burden 
at trial. 
3. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft fraud-generaI)--misstates the law and 
operative facts and is confusing. 
4. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft fraud-connections)-misstates the law and 
operative facts, is confusing, and is cumulative. 
5. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft fraud-limitations)-misstates the law and 
operative facts, is confusing, and is cumulative. 
6. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft fraud-Third Party Beneficiary Agreement 
and Rules and Rcgulations)-misstates the party to which it applies; misstates the law, is 
confusing, and is cumulative. 
7. Reliance-misstates the law. 
8. Reasonable reliance misstates the law, is confusing, misleading, and cumulative 
9. Unenforceable Contract-misstates facts; misstates law. 
KIRK 'WOOLF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1. Facts Not in Dispute-misstates the facts. 
2. Duty to Disclose-misstates the law and the requirements of Printcraft's burden 
at trial. 
3. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft tfaud-general)--misstates the law and 
operative facts and is confusing. 
Plaintiffs Objectirg~~DIfclldallts' Proposed Jury Instructions Page 2 
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4. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft fraud-connections)-misstates the law and 
operative facts, is confusing, and is cumulative. 
5. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft fraud-limitations)-misstates the law and 
operative facts, is confusing, and is cumulative. 
6. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft fraud-Third Party Beneficiary Agreement 
and Rules and Regulations)-misstates the party to which it applies; misstates the law, is 
confusing, and is cumulative. 
7. Reliance-misstates the law. 
8. Reasonable reliance - misstates the law, is confusing, misleading, and cumulative 
9. Unenforceable Contract--misstates facts; misstates law. 
SUNNYSIDE PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1. Instruction No. I-misstates the facts; contains inelevant instructions re: facts; 
cumulative. 
2. Instruction No.2 - confusing and difficult to understand; cumulative; should 
utilize Plaintiffs instruction regarding duty to disclose 
3. Instruction No.3-misstates the law; cumulative; confusing. 
4. Instruction No. 4----misstates the facts and the law; cumulative; confusing. 
5. Instruction No.5-misstates the law; cumulative; confusing. 
6. Instruction No.6 - misstates the law; cumulative; confusing 
7. Instruction No.7-misstates the law; cumulative; confusing. 
8. Instruction No.8-misstates the facts and the law; cumulative; confusing. 
9. Instruction No.9-misstates the law; cumulative; confusing. 
10. Instruction No. Il-irrelevant; confusing. 
11. Instruction No.12-misstatcs the law; confusing. 
Plailltiff~s Objections to Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions Page 3 
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12. Instruction No. 13 - misstates the law; cumulative; confusing. 
13. Instruction No. 16--misstates the facts and the law; irrelevant; unnecessary; 
cumulative. 
14. Instruction No. 17-irrelevant; misstates the law. 
15. Instruction No. I8-irrelevant; misleading; misstates the law; cumulative. 
16. Instruction No. 19-not based on the evidence; misleading; misstates the facts; 
irrelevant; confusing. 
17. Instruction Nos. 20 & 2 I-misstate the law and facts; confusing; cumulative. 
18. Instruction No. 22-misstates the facts and the law; misleading; irrelevant. 
19. Instruction No. 23-misstates the law and misleading. 
20. Instruction No. 24--misstates the law; misleading; cumulative. 
21. Instruction No. 25 - misstates the law; cumulative. 
22. Instruction No. 27-misstates the law and the facts. 
23. Instruction No. 29-misstates the law; not a jury question. 
24. Instruction No. 30-irrelevant; fails to describe the specific claim to which 
punitive damages may be awarded, if any. 
DATED: February 24, 2009 
Plaintiffs Objections to Defendants' Proposed Jury Instrllctions Page 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r certify r am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on February 24, 2009, I 
served a true and correct copy ofthe PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANTS' 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS on the following by the method of delivery 
designated below: 
Mark Fuller 
Fuller & Can 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935 
Fax: (208)524-7167 
Bryan Smith 
McGrath & Smith 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731 
Fax: (208) 529-4166 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: (208)529-1300 
rney 
. Brunson 
Beard St. Clair GafTney PA 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
o U.S. Mail 0 Hand-delivered r:zr;:csimile 
o U.S. Mail 0 Hand-delivered lliacsimile 
// 
o U.S. Mail 0 Hand-delivered CdFacsimile 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISH No. 3558 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISH No. 6996 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2) 05 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
jef1(?i!-beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
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DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. an Idaho 
corporation, TRAVIS WATERS, an 
individual, 
Plainli ftlCounterdefendant, 
vs. 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC .. an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual, 
KIRK WOOLF, an individual, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-06·7097 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS FOR JNOV, NEW TRIAL, 
AND DIRECTED VERDICT 
The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft), through counsel of record, Beard 
st. Clair Gaffney PA, hereby objects to all post-trial motions filed by the defendants. The 
post-trial motions are not supported in either law or fact. Since 110 judgment on the 
verdict has been entered, the post-trial motions have been prematurely tiled. Printcraft 
Objection to Defendants' Motions for JNOV, New Trial, and Directed Verdict Page 
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reserves the right to supplement this objection \vith detailed briefing once judgment on 
the verdict is entered and a hearing date is set for the post-trial motions. 
DATED: March 26, 2009 
d /"7 
I',i ' ~j,>--.' ~£- /JV,., >f. 
-•• ~ ~ \ // 'oL.. 
Michpe~ D: Gaffney 
JeffreYD. Brunson 
Of Beard St. Clair GafTney P A 
Attomcys for Printcraft Press, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certily I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on March 26, 2009, I 
served a true ~U1d correct copy of the OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR 
.INOV, NEW TRIAL, AND DIRECTED VERDICT on the following by the method of 
delivery designated below: 
Mark Fuller 
Fuller & Carr 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, 10 83405-0935 
Fax: (208) 524-7167 
Bryan D. Smith 
Smith, Driscoll & Associates 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, 10 83405-0731 
Fax: (208) 529-4166 
Bonneville County Courthollse 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, 10 83402 
Fax: (208) 529-1300 
Ii 
I' )/, <:f-
- ~\ /: ~ ,/ .'-----.~~ \ 
Mich~r GafIney , 
Jeffrey!{!/Brunson 
Beard St. Claif Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
o U.S. Mail 0 Hand-delivered GF:csimile 
o U.S. Mail 0 Hand-delivered fLlr;:csimile 
~/ 
o U.S. Mail 0 Hand-delivered O/iacsimile 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
MINUTE ENTRY 
vs. Case No. CV-06-7097 
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Defendant. 
On the 27th day of February, 2009, Defendant's motion in 
limine to exclude written leases came before the Honorable Joel 
E. Tingey, District Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Michael Gaffney and Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared on behalf 
of the Plaintiff. 
Mr. Mark Fuller appeared on behalf of the Defendant 
Sunnyside Utilities. 
Mr. Bryan Smith appeared on behalf of Defendant Doyle Beck 
and Kirk Woolf. 
Mr. Fuller presented Defendant's motion in limine to exclude 
written leases. Mr. Gaffney argued in opposition to the motion. 
Mr. Smith joined in Defendant's motion in limine re: leases. 
Mr. Fuller presented rebuttal argument. 
The Court granted the motion to exclude written leases. The 
1838 
Court will not allow Smith's testimony regarding rental payment 
loss. 
The Court will prepare an order on its ruling. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
H:cv067097.8 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 2009, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Michael Gaffney 
Jeff Brunson 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Mark R. Fuller 
Dan Beck 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Bryan Smith 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
RONALD LONGMORE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIST~CT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNtVl00E27 Pl2 :47 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., and Idaho 
Corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., and Idaho Corporation, 
and SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, and Idaho 
limited liability corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -06-7097 
ORDER IN RE: EXCLUSION OF 
WOOLF'S PRIOR FELONY 
CONVICTION 
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Kirk Woolf's motion in limine. 
Woolf's motion seeks to prevent the plaintiffs from presenting evidence of Woolf's prior 
felony conviction of approximately 25 years ago. The Court finds that a hearing on the 
motion is not necessary. 
Generally, evidence of prior felony convictions offered for the purpose of 
attacking a witness' credibility is only admissible if its probative value outweighs its 
prejudicial effect. See LR.E. 609 (a). Under LR.E. 609 (b), evidence of a witness' felony 
conviction is inadmissible "if a period of more than ten (10) years has elapsed since the 
date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for 
that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of 
justice, that the probative value of the conviction suppOlied by specific facts and 
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect." 
1841 
ORDER - 1 
Ty 
The Court finds that based on the nature of the conviction and the time that has 
elapsed since the conviction, any probative value of the conviction is outweighed by the 
potential for unfair prejudice. Accordingly, Woolfs motion is granted and the Parties are 
precluded from presenting evidence of any such conviction. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ...L.4-'--,-day of February, 2009. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE gr" I hereby certify that on this ~ day of February 2009, I did send a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document upo the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; 
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Bryan D. Smith 
Smith, Driscoll & Associates 
P.O. Box 50731 
414 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Mark R. Fuller 
Daniel R. Beck 
FULLER & CARR 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-9035 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Lance 1. Shuster 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
Beard S1. Clair Gaffney 
2105 Coronado St. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
ORDER- 3 1843 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
Deputy Clerk 
